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GAY LIBERATION IN THE ILLIBERAL STATE
Stewart L. Chang †
Abstract: A comparative analysis of incrementalist approaches to gay rights as
they are deployed in the United States and Singapore demonstrates that seeking gay
rights in a full democracy is actually no better than seeking them in an authoritarian
regime. Incrementalism ultimately promotes sexual normativity by dividing the gay
community into “good gays,” who deserve equal protections, and “bad queers,” who are
further marginalized. Incrementalism in the United States began with decriminalization
of sodomy and terminated with the recognition of gay marriage but did so by imagining
gay sexuality within the context of committed relationships. The gay rights movement in
Singapore is currently challenging the constitutionality of the country’s anti-sodomy
statute, but has also encountered problems with bifurcating good gays from bad queers.
Singaporean gay rights advocacy has adopted an approach that looks similar to
incrementalism in the United States, but is actually adapted as a strategy of survival
within the authoritarian structures of its illiberal democratic government. Dissecting
these similarities shows how gay rights in the United States has acquiesced to a similar,
but more hidden, disciplinary regime of social control that venerates marriage as an
imagined ideal and suppresses other forms of sexual expression. The recent decision by
the Singapore judiciary to reject the good gay and bad queer dichotomy and treat the two
similarly, however, has forced gay rights advocacy to adapt and imagine a different and
more unified strategy than in the United States.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Although the decisions in United States v. Windsor 1 and
Hollingsworth v. Perry2 were generally regarded as victories for equal gay
rights in the United States, some commentators have met the decisions with
more guarded optimism.3 In both cases, the United States Supreme Court
†
Assistant Professor of Law, Whittier Law School and Assistant Professor of English (by courtesy),
Whittier College. The author is grateful to Erez Aloni, Lynette J. Chua, Judith Daar, Sheldon Lyke, Julie
Manasfi, Manoj Mate, Radha Pathak, Martin Pritikin, Dickson Su, and Seval Yildirim for their helpful
comments, feedback, and conversation.
1
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
2
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
3
See Daniel J. Crooks III, Toward “Liberty”: How the Marriage of Substantive Due Process and
Equal Protection in Lawrence and Windsor Sets the Stage for the Inevitable Loving of Our Time, 8
CHARLESTON L. REV. 223, 224–25 (2013) (“Reasonable minds disagree over what exact legal basis or
bases Justice Kennedy employed to arrive at the result in Windsor, with some law professors declaring the
Windsor opinion to be a clarification of ‘rational basis with bite’; others focused more on Justice Kennedy's
employment of federalism principles; and still others convinced that, without explicitly saying as much,
Justice Kennedy relied most heavily on substantive due process arguments.”); Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
“Not Without Political Power”: Gays and Lesbians, Equal Protection and the Suspect Class Doctrine, 65
ALA. L. REV. 975, 977 (2014) (“Because the Court issued minimalist rulings in Hollingsworth and Windsor,
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comes short of granting sexual orientation the protections of heightened
scrutiny as a matter of equal protection, for which many hoped.4 However,
some interpreters have read Windsor and Hollingsworth as reflecting a
positive incremental shift in public attitudes towards gays in the United
States. 5 The question remains, though, whether such incremental shifts
towards a final goal of equality, as represented in the marriage equality
movement in the United States, is completely positive.
Rather,
incrementalism could represent a culmination of the heteronormative
consequences feared by some gay rights scholars following Lawrence v.
Texas. 6 In striking down the Texas statute on substantive due process
grounds 7 rather than prohibiting government sanction of homosexual
the doctrinal status of sexual orientation in equal protection case law remains unsettled and
undertheorized.”); see also Susannah W. Pollvogt, Windsor, Animus, and the Future of Equality, 113
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 204 (2013).
4
See William D. Araiza, After the Tiers: Windsor, Congressional Power to Enforce Equal
Protection, and the Challenge of Pointillist Constitutionalism, 94 B.U. L. REV. 367 (2014); see also
Heather K. Gerken, Larry and Lawrence, 42 TULSA L. REV. 843, 849 (2007) (“I believe that equal
protection is the right frame for most future questions [after Lawrence]—not the formal and cramped sort
of equal protection analysis we see in Justice O'Connor's opinion, but a robust form of equal protection that
recognizes the possibility of stigma even when people are nominally being treated the same.”); Hutchinson,
supra note 3; Adam Lamparello, Why Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in Windsor Shortchanged Same-Sex
Couples, 46 CONN. L. REV. ONLINE 27 (2014), available at http://connecticutlawreview.org/files/2014/01/
Lamparello.JusticeKennedysOpinioninWindsor.Final_.pdf.
5
See Anthony Niedwiecki, Save Our Children: Overcoming the Narrative that Gays and Lesbians
are Harmful to Children, 21 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 125 (2013); Maxwell L. Stearns, Grains of Sand
or Butterfly Effect: Standing, the Legitimacy of Precedent, and Reflections on Hollingsworth and Windsor,
65 ALA. L. REV. 349, 397 (2013); see also Crooks, supra note 3.
6
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY)
MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 83-109 (2008); David B. Cruz, Spinning Lawrence,
or Lawrence v. Texas and the Promotion of Heterosexuality, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 249 (2005); Katherine M.
Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004); Nancy D.
Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle
the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,” 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993); Marc Spindelman,
Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615 (2004); see also Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s
Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1389 (2005) (“[W]hat to many people, including lesbians and gay men and a
number of our heterosexual allies, looks like increasingly good news—the movement from Hardwick’s
anti-gay moral disapproval of homosexuality to Lawrence’s reversal of it, along with its own assimilation
of homosexuality to a heterosexualized marriage norm, to Goodridge's recent perfection of the
assimilationism—is to others, chiefly those concerned with stopping sexuality's abuse, a decidedly mixed
bag.”).
7
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (“[L]iberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding
how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”); see also Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence
Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1148 (2004) (“[T]he Lawrence Court took a law that focused on
homosexuals alone and used it to strike down laws that banned both homosexual and heterosexual
sodomy . . . . Instead of relying on a narrow equal protection rationale to strike down laws of the four states
that targeted gay sex, the Court dramatically and unexpectedly revived substantive due process to strike
down the laws of all thirteen states with sodomy laws.”). But see Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas:
The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speaking Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1902–16 (2004)
(suggesting that the Lawrence decision represents a blend of substantive due process and equal protection).
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conduct or identity,8 the Lawrence Court situated gay sex underneath the
larger constitutional umbrella of sexual privacy, which until then was
characterized by consensual heterosexual sex.9 The Court did not guarantee
the rights of gay persons to not be discriminated against; instead, it affirmed
a broader right to intimacy for all people, but only in certain contexts.10 The
Lawrence decision did not state there is nothing wrong with gay sex, but that
gay sex is acceptable in the exact same contexts that heterosexual sex is
acceptable.11 The Court simply marked the private sphere of consensual
sexual relationships, whether heterosexual or gay, as inviolate. 12 In
Lawrence, Justice Kennedy’s contextualization of sex within a “personal
bond that is more enduring”13 pointed towards a privileging of marriage as
the ideal framework for these protections. Windsor continued the legacy of
Lawrence in furthering the right of all individuals to enjoy intimacy in
certain contexts, but further venerated and entrenched marriage as the
definitive context for intimacy.14 Writing for the Windsor majority, Justice
8
See Sonia Katyal, Sexuality and Sovereignty: The Global Limits and Possibilities of Lawrence, 14
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1429, 1435 (2006) (“Yet Lawrence, by focusing on privacy and liberty, instead,
has quietly and subtly reoriented this project along a different and more convergent continuum that
emphasizes the need for protection through the lens of autonomy, privacy, and liberty, rather than the trope
of expressive identity.”); Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Road Not Taken: Sex Equality in Lawrence v.
Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1081, 1089 (2004) (“By choosing the doctrinal road it did, the Court effectively
extended heterosexuality's right to sexual privacy and sexual autonomy to gay men and lesbian women.
The question is not whether same-sex sexual expression should be subject to special prohibitions (it should
not), but whether heterosexuality’s substantively sex-unequal rules should be extended rather than
challenged and changed.”).
9
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
10
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons
who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be
refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does
involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common
to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.”).
11
Id. at 573–74 (“The Casey decision again confirmed that our laws and tradition afford
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education . . . . Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy
for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.”).
12
Id. at 578 (“Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage
in their conduct without intervention of the government. ‘It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a
realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.’”) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.,
505 U.S. at 874).
13
Id. at 567; see Craig Willse & Dean Spade, Freedom in a Regulatory State?: Lawrence, Marriage
and Biopolitics, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 309, 314 (2005) (“They do so by addressing homosexuality in terms
of ‘coupled’ behavior, rather than specific acts of sodomy, thereby constructing a homosexual identity
more parallel to incentivized heterosexual family norms.”).
14
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013) (“[S]ome States concluded that same-sex
marriage ought to be given recognition and validity in the law for those same-sex couples who wish to
define themselves by their commitment to each other . . . . Slowly at first and then in rapid course, the laws
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Kennedy specifically connected marriage to the “more enduring” bond that
he alluded to in Lawrence.15
The progression from Lawrence to Windsor confirms the prediction of
some prominent scholars that the incremental fight for gay rights in the
United States begins with decriminalization of anti-sodomy and terminates
with the recognition of gay marriage.16 Yet this road to the legitimization of
gay rights also entrenches a hierarchized dichotomy of the “good gay” over
the “bad queer,” where the assimilated good gay becomes the figure of
acceptable gay identity in mainstream heterosexual society, and the bad
queer is further marginalized.17 Windsor essentially affirms the sexually
normative sentiment of Lawrence, which has now perhaps become difficult
to counteract. As the Ninth Circuit ruled in Perry v. Brown—the underlying
case to Hollingsworth—the legitimization of gay marriage is a one-way
ratchet, and once realized there is no turning back.18 Indeed, it is now
virtually impossible to go back to Lawrence and reconsider the distinctions
of treating anti-sodomy as a matter of “we are not being treated equally to
heterosexuals” versus “we are not doing anything wrong.”
of New York came to acknowledge the urgency of this issue for same-sex couples who wanted to affirm
their commitment to one another before their children, their family, their friends, and their community.”).
15
Id. at 2692 (“The States’ interest in defining and regulating the marital relation, subject to
constitutional guarantees, stems from the understanding that marriage is more than a routine classification
for purposes of certain statutory benefits. Private, consensual sexual intimacy between two adult persons of
the same sex may not be punished by the State, and it can form ‘but one element in a personal bond that is
more enduring.’”) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)); see also id. at 2694 (“The
differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects . . . and
whose relationship the State has sought to dignify.”).
16
Jeremiah A. Ho, Weather Permitting: Incrementalism, Animus, and the Art of Forecasting
Marriage Equality After U.S. v. Windsor, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 7 (2014) (“By consensus, [William]
Eskridge, [Yuval] Merin, and [Kees] Waaldijk all prescribe those steps in the following sequence: (1) the
decriminalization of consensual same-sex intimacy occurs first; (2) then anti-discrimination against sexual
minorities is furthered; and (3) lastly, the relationships of same-sex couples are then legally recognized.
Once a state has crossed these three steps, the conditions for marriage equality will then be most evident.”).
17
See CARL STYCHIN, A NATION BY RIGHTS: NATIONAL CULTURES, SEXUAL IDENTITY POLITICS,
AND THE DISCOURSE OF RIGHTS 200 (1998) (“[L]esbians and gays seeking rights may embrace the ideal of
‘respectability,’ a construction that then perpetuates a division between ‘good gays’ and (disreputable) ‘bad
queers.’”); Jade McGleughlin & Sue Hyde, Can a Diamond Ever Be Gay?, 9 STUD. GENDER & SEXUALITY
184, 192 (2008) (“We do not want to be the good gays cast against the ever more marginalized group that
chooses (or has no choice about) other ways to live and love.”).
18
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012) (“By using their initiative power to target a
minority group and withdraw a right that it possessed, without a legitimate reason for doing so, the People
of California violated the Equal Protection Clause.”); Eric Berger, Lawrence’s Stealth Constitutionalism
and Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 788 (2013) (“The Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning was narrow, relying primarily on Romer to hold unconstitutional the revocation of marriage
rights in a state that had once offered such rights and still offers domestic partnership. Should the Supreme
Court choose to avoid the momentous substantive question of whether the U.S. Constitution categorically
forbids states from banning same-sex marriage, it could instead resolve Perry on standing grounds.”)
(internal citations omitted).
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Thus, it is useful to examine a country that is currently at this
“Lawrence moment” in terms of its own anti-sodomy statute. The Singapore
Court of Appeals recently consolidated two cases challenging the
constitutionality of its anti-sodomy statute, Section 377A of its Penal
Code.19 The statute reads:
Any male person who, in public or private, commits, or abets
the commission of, or procures or attempts to procure the
commission by any male person of, any act of gross indecency
with another male person, shall be punished with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to 2 years.20
The two cases, one by a committed gay couple of over 15 years,21 and the
other by a man arrested for having oral sex in a shopping mall restroom,22
represent not only the nuances of the “we are not being treated equally” and
the “we are not doing anything wrong” arguments, but also the two poles of
the good gay and bad queer dichotomy. The Singapore Court of Appeal’s
decision to treat the two cases together, despite protestations from some gay
activists to recognize them separately, illuminates and can potentially
subvert the false dichotomy between good gays and bad queers.
The divergent strategies for seeking gay rights in Singapore also
illustrate the peculiarities of advocacy in Singapore’s hybridized form of
government, which is described by some scholars as an “illiberal
democracy” for its adherence to an authoritarian rule of law despite the
structural veneer of free elections and an embrace of free market
capitalism. 23 Some critics have denounced the illiberal democracy of
Singapore as breeding a population disciplined to follow the rules, leading to
an incomplete or stunted citizenry when compared to its counterparts in
Western democracies.24 Arguably, seeking gay rights in a full democracy is
19
Selina Lum, Appeals of Two Section 377A Challenges Will Be Heard Together, STRAITS TIMES
(Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.straitstimes.com/breaking-news/singapore/story/appeals-two-section-377achallenges-will-be-heard-together-20131010 (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).
20
Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) s 337(A).
21
Lim Meng Suang and Kenneth Chee Mun-Leon v. Attorney General (Lim Meng Suang I) [2013]
SGHC 73, at para. 2.
22
Tan Eng Hong v. Attorney General (Tan Eng Hong II) [2013] SGHC 199, at para. 4.
23
See DANIEL BELL, DAVID BROWN, KANISHKA JAYASURIYA, & DAVID MARTIN JONES, TOWARD
ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN PACIFIC ASIA (1995); see also KEVIN HEWISON, RICHARD ROBISON, & GARRY
RODAN, SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE 1990S: AUTHORITARIANISM, DEMOCRACY, AND CAPITALISM (1993).
24
See CHRISTOPHER LINGLE, SINGAPORE’S AUTHORITARIAN CAPITALISM: ASIAN VALUES, FREE
MARKET ILLUSIONS, AND POLITICAL DEPENDENCY (1996); Hussin Mutalib, Illiberal Democracy and the
Future of Opposition in Singapore, 21 THIRD WORLD Q. 313, 325–26 (2000) (“The Republic’s traditional
immigrant and clan mentality, which continues to influence the psyche of the majority Chinese populace
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actually no better than seeking them in an authoritarian regime, and
ultimately produces similar results. By taking an approach that enables the
good gay and bad queer dichotomy and promotes sexual normativity, gay
rights in the United States has acquiesced to a similar disciplinary model of
social control as Singapore.25 Although some scholars have suggested that
Lawrence and Windsor are potentially libertarian decisions,26 the two cases
are actually illiberal decisions. Rather than liberate, they confine gay rights
to a restrictive time, place, and manner, in much the same way that
Singapore does, albeit in a more unapologetic fashion.
Part I of this article discusses how gay rights advocacy in Singapore
evolved to accommodate its hybridized form of government but ultimately
adopted a modified strategy of incrementalism seen in Western democracies.
Controversies within the gay community as a result of the two different
constitutional challenges to Section 377A demonstrate the pitfalls of
adopting Western incrementalism as a model, namely the propensity to fall
into the good gay and bad queer dichotomy.
Part II analyzes how the Singaporean High Court decisions upholding
Section 377A further demonstrate the insufficiencies of incrementalist equal
protection approaches. It then looks at the ways in which pushing gay rights
as a liberty interest issue reveals the normative structures at play not only in
Singapore, but also in the West. Part III discusses how the impetus in the
West to treat gay rights as a matter of equal treatment of gays to
heterosexuals rather than an overall liberty interest for all, merely produces
another version of restrictive heteronormativity that is no different from the
limitations on gay expression that currently exist in Singapore. Because the
Singaporean Court of Appeals has rejected this bifurcation and the
distinction between good gays and bad queers, the Singaporean government
is forcing gay rights advocacy to adapt and imagine a different and
potentially more unified strategy than in the United States.

(whose emphasis on financial and material pursuits is universally known), and the lack of a developed
competitive political tradition given the Republic’s short period of nationhood, has created a generation of
Singaporeans who do not know, let alone are capable of fathoming, some other style of governance than the
PAP.”). But see Simon S.C. Tay, Human Rights, Culture, and the Singapore Example, 41 MCGILL L. J.
743, 745 (1996).
25
See Dean Spade, Under the Cover of Gay Rights, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 79 (2013).
26
See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, CATO SUP.
CT. REV. 21 (2003); Randy E. Barnett, Grading Justice Kennedy: A Reply to Professor Carpenter, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 1582 (2005); John R. Dorocak, Is the Constitution Only Libertarian and Not Socially
Conservative? U.S. v. Windsor and the Unconstitutionality of DOMA’s Definition of Marriage to Exclude
Same-Sex Couples—Requiem for a Heavyweight, 24 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 263 (2014). But see
Carpenter, supra note 7.
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Singapore is a nation of interesting paradoxes that create an
unexpected forum for exploring, critiquing, and possibly resolving divisions
in the politics of gay advocacy. Singapore is a hybridized form of
democracy: it partially embraces Western democratic principles in order to
promote accelerated economic expansion, yet imposes heavy restrictions on
individual civil liberties in order to maintain social stability.27 Ruled as a
British colony since 1826, Singapore gained independence first as a member
of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 and then as a separate nation in
1965. 28 At the time it separated from Malaysia, Singapore was in a
precarious economic condition. Under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew and
the People’s Action Party (PAP), the government rejected socialism and
embraced capitalism in the midst of the Cold War to attract foreign
investment, resulting in rapid economic growth. 29 Believing that this
economic growth depended on social stability, the PAP government enacted
authoritarian policies, which essentially consolidated control for the ruling
party and justified them with the discourse of pragmatism and survival.30
For example, Singapore placed significant restrictions on free speech,31 the
press,32 and free association,33 rationalizing that criticism of the government

27
LYNETTE J. CHUA, MOBILIZING GAY SINGAPORE: RIGHTS AND RESISTANCE IN AN AUTHORITARIAN
STATE 29 (2014) [hereinafter “MOBILIZING GAY SINGAPORE”] (“The PAP constantly reminds Singaporeans
of their nation’s tumultuous conception and touts social harmony as essential to economic survival, framing
the two together as paramount to the nation’s security.”).
28
See Michael Haas, The Political History, in THE SINGAPORE PUZZLE 15–22 (Michael Haas ed., 2d
ed. 2014).
29
Id. at 23 (“When it became clear that Singapore leaders had totally abandoned socialism, direct
foreign investment poured into the country, and the country decreasingly depended on its role in entrepot
trade. What followed as spectacular economic growth, which enhanced the international reputation of its
prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew.”).
30
See BENG-HUAT CHUA, COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY IN SINGAPORE 19 (1995)
[hereinafter “COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY”] (“Since the necessity of economic growth
had been ideologically raised to the ‘only reality,’ any process that contributed to economic growth was
therefore ‘practical,’ indeed ‘necessary’ for the survival of the nation. ‘Pragmatism became the term used
to gloss over economic instrumental rationality . . . . The state has over the years thoroughly penetrated and
controlled society in the name of ensuring economic growth’”); Kenneth Paul Tan, New Politics for a
Renaissance City?, in RENAISSANCE SINGAPORE?: ECONOMY, CULTURE, AND POLITICS 17 (Kenneth Paul
Tan ed., 2007) (“Old politics in Singapore has mainly been about shaping the public imagination with
national narratives of permanent vulnerability and fragile success.”).
31
Sedition Act (Cap 290, 2013 Rev Ed) s 2–4; see also Constitution of the Republic of Singapore
(1965), Art 14.
32
Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (Cap 206, 2002 Rev Ed).
33
Public Order Act (Cap 257A, 2009 Rev Ed) s 5.
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upsets social stability.34 The government also enacted the Internal Security
Act to suspend the liberty interests of individuals suspected of dissidence in
the name of national security.35 Political theorists classify Singapore as an
illiberal democracy, defined by three distinguishing characteristics: “first, a
non-neutral understanding of the state; second, the evolution of a
rationalistic and legalistic technocracy that manages the developing state as
a corporate enterprise; finally, the development of a managed rather than a
critical public space and civil society.”36 Western political scientists often
criticize Singapore as incomplete in comparison to the Western democracies
for its restrictions on individual civil liberties and management of its citizens
in contrast to Western democracies.37 However, the citizenry by and large
has accepted, or been disciplined into accepting, 38 this mode of
government.39 In this respect, Singapore epitomizes the disciplinary power
of state “governmentality.”40 Michel Foucault defines governmentality as the
exercise of power over a population through “political economy as its major
form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical
instrument.” 41 Through these mechanisms of control, Singapore has

34

See generally Derek Davies, The Press, in THE SINGAPORE PUZZLE 91 (Michael Haas ed., 2d ed.

2014).

35

Internal Security Act (Cap 143, 1985 Rev Ed); see also COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND
DEMOCRACY, supra note 30, at 31.
36
BELL et. al., supra note 23, at 163.
37
See Clark D. Neher, The Case for Singapore, in THE SINGAPORE PUZZLE 46 (Michael Haas ed., 2d
ed. 2014) (“[Singapore’s] political system, controlled as it is by the People’s Action Party (PAP), is more
authoritarian than Americans would find acceptable, and its emphasis on law and order, rules, and
conformity have given the island state an antiseptic quality very much at odds with the more open
American culture.”); see also JOTHIE RAJAH, AUTHORITARIAN RULE OF LAW: LEGISLATION, DISCOURSE
AND LEGITIMACY IN SINGAPORE 8 (2012) (“[I]ndividual rights are at the heart of liberal conceptions of the
‘rule of law’ . . . . the Singapore state neither adheres to the pre-liberal constraints on government, nor
regards individual rights as inviolable.”).
38
See Tan, supra note 30, at 17, 22 (“Through a thoroughly rationalized system of regimentation,
training, bureaucratic administration, surveillance, material incentives, and affluence (classic features of
Herbert Marcuse’s (1964) ‘one-dimensional’ advanced industrial society), members of this class have been,
and continue to be, socialized as individuals who are affirmative, conservative, fearful of both change as
well as difference, and materialistic and consumerist in orientation. The system produces individuals who
fit the authoritarian personality associated with vulgar accounts of Confucianism.”); see also Mutalib,
supra note 24, at 326.
39
COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 30, at 19 (“[T]he independent state is
also an interventionist state that reduces the power of the civil society, reducing the government/people
relationship to a bargain: extensive political and social administration for improved material life.”); see also
Neher, supra note 37, at 58 (“In fact, many Singaporeans do not covet Western-style democracy, fearing
that it could jeopardize their stability and threaten their affluent living standards.”).
40
See generally RAJAH, supra note 37, at 55–64.
41
MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION 108 (Michel Senellart et al. eds.,
Graham Burchell trans., 2007).
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successfully disciplined a population characterized by self-policing and
working within the rules in the interest of the nation.42
B.

The Illiberal Pragmatics of the Gay Rights Movement in Singapore

The nuances of Singapore’s history as an illiberal democracy has
shaped its local gay rights movement.43 Audrey Yue describes gay identity
in Singapore as functioning within “illiberal pragmatism,” which is
“characterized by the ambivalence between non-liberalism and
neoliberalism, rationalism and irrationalism that governs the illegality of
homosexuality in Singapore.”44 The stance that the Singapore government
eventually adopted in respect to its growing gay population utilized the same
rhetoric of pragmatism previously deployed in its justification of other
authoritarian restrictions.45 Singapore retains Section 377A of the Penal
Code, the colonial anti-sodomy statute it had inherited from the British,46 but
selectively enforces it. The government typically reserves enforcement only
for cases involving force, coercion, or public indecency.47 However, so long
as Section 377A continues to be in effect, it could be invoked at any time,
and there have been periodic seasons of impromptu increased police
42

See Geraldine Heng & Janadas Devan, State Fatherhood: The Politics of Nationalism, Sexuality,
and Race in Singapore, in NATIONALISMS AND SEXUALITIES 343 (Andrew Parker et al. eds., 1992) (“[B]y
repeatedly focusing anxiety on the fragility of the new nation, its ostensible vulnerability to every kind of
exigency, the state’s originating agency is periodically reinvoked and ratified, its access to wide-ranging
instruments of power in the service of national protection continually consolidated. It is a post-Foucauldian
truism that they who successfully define and superintend a crisis, furnishing its lexicon and discursive
parameters, successfully confirm themselves the owners of power, the administration of crisis operating to
revitalize ownership of the instruments of power even as it vindicates the necessity of their use.”).
43
See COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 30; see also Lynette J. Chua,
Pragmatic Resistance, Law, and Social Movements in Authoritarian States: The Case of Gay Collective
Action in Singapore, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 713 (2012).
44
Audrey Yue, Queer Singapore: A Critical Introduction, in QUEER SINGAPORE: ILLIBERAL
CITIZENSHIP AND MEDIATED CULTURES 2 (Audrey Yue & Jun Zubillaga-Pow eds., 2012).
45
Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at paras. 84, 86 (“[D]uring the October 2007 Parliamentary Debates
and submitted that in view of the reasons put forward for the retention of [Section] 377A, the purpose of
the provision was now this: since neither the pro-[Section] 377A side nor the anti-[Section] 377A side
would be able to convince the other of its point of view, and since pushing the issue would polarise and
divide our society, we should live and let live, and it was best that we do nothing and leave [Section] 377A
as it stood . . . . it was a practical reason why, amongst other more basic reasons, [Section] 377A should be
retained.”).
46
See ANDREW PHANG & CHAN WING CHEONG, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN SINGAPORE (2001).
47
Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (22 October 2007) vol 83 at col 2175 (“Police
have not been proactively enforcing the provision and will continue to take this stance. But this does not
mean that the section is purely symbolic and thus redundant. There have been convictions over the years
involving cases where minors were exploited and abused or where male adults committed the offence in a
public place such as a public toilet or back-lane.”); id. (“Moreover, it has not been invoked in respect of
consensual sex since 1993. So this law is rarely applied or, if applied, it applies to minors or acts in
public.”).
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involvement against the gay community. 48 The gay community also
struggles with ambivalence and uncertainty with other illiberal regulations,
such as limitations on expression of gay identity. 49 Unsystematic
enforcement of Section 377A over the years has partially contributed to a
culture of vigilance and self-policing within the gay community.50 Section
377A, therefore, demonstrates the disciplinary power of the state over the
gay community in Singapore,51 and illustrates Foucault’s principle of the
panopticon.52 The fight for civil liberties is often regarded as criticism of the
government and potentially a sign of punishable disloyalty.53 Thus, the gay
community has progressed cautiously for fear that Section 377A or other
laws could be deployed at any time as a means of quashing activism.54 As a
result of the authoritarian regime’s conditioning, the gay movement in
Singapore has deemed itself fragile and needs to work within the illiberal
system as a strategy for survival.55 This approach ironically mirrors the
same pragmatism that justifies the illiberalism of the state.56
48

See COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 30, at 53 (“Despite the first
openings for the [gay] movement, followed by its first escalation, expansion, and diversification, the early
1990s proved to be a hostile time to be gay in Singapore. The police frequently raided gay businesses and
entrapped gay men at popular cruising grounds.”).
49
See Mariko Oi, Is Singapore’s Stance on Homosexuality Changing?, BBC (Apr. 22, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22088852 (last visited Nov. 15, 2014) (“But not only is sex between
men illegal, there are also censorship guidelines in Singapore which ban media outlets from promoting
homosexual acts. ‘Exactly what is prohibited is grey but the familiar line is that you are not supposed to
portray homosexuality in a positive or normal way,’ says [Professor Lynette J.] Chua from the National
University of Singapore. ‘So is an interview of a celebrity who is in a same-sex relationship considered the
promotion of homosexuality? Apparently yes, because the broadcaster has been fined before.’”).
50
See Simon Obendorf, Both Contagion and Cure: Queer Politics in the Global City-State, in
QUEER SINGAPORE: ILLIBERAL CITIZENSHIP AND MEDIATED CULTURES 97, 97 (Audrey Yue & Jun
Zubillaga-Pow eds., 2012) (describing the dilemma for gay activists in Singapore “of attempting to
extrapolate from official pronouncements the range of queer identities, spaces and behaviours that will be
tolerated by Singaporean state managers.”).
51
See id. (“[T]he regulatory and policing powers of the Singaporean government give it a unique
capacity to coerce, surveil and intervene in varied aspects of queer life.”); see also Ryan Goodman, Beyond
the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms, and Social Panoptics, 89 CAL. L. REV. 643, 688–
89 (2001) (describing the role of anti-sodomy statutes in producing an atmosphere where “many lesbian
and gay individuals regularly feel themselves under the eye of power.”).
52
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 201 (Alan Sheridan trans.,
1979) (describing how the panopticon, a central watchtower in a prison, is deployed to produce selfpolicing subjects by “creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it;
in short, that inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the
bearers . . . the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at any one moment; but he must be sure
that he may always be so.”).
53
See Jothie Rajah & Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Of Absences, Masks, and Exceptions: Cause
Lawyering in Singapore, 31 WIS. INT’L L.J. 646 (2013).
54
See COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 30, at 45 (“Faced with external
threats from the state and media, [Singaporean gay activists] adjusted tactics to fight for the movement’s
survival.”).
55
Id. at 146 (“Deploying pragmatic resistance to advance their movement without jeopardizing its
survival, gay activists interact with formal law, political norms and shifts in these forces to push the
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Lynette Chua describes this strategy for the gay movement in
Singapore as “pragmatic resistance.” She views pragmatic resistance as an
alternative strategy
to represent homosexuality positively through whatever cracks
they can find or pry open formal law and advocating for
decriminalization and acceptance of homosexuality [in order to]
further defy the symbolism of Section 377A and regulations
that inherently treat homosexuality as wrong or deviant.57
Although Chua defines this strategy of “pragmatic resistance” in contrast to
earlier Western models of gay liberation,58 the Singaporean approach to gay
rights actually more closely resembles later strategies of incrementalism that
eventually became successful in the United States and Europe.59 Under the
incremental approach, decriminalization of sodomy is the first step. 60
Through the 1990s and 2000s, the gay community in Singapore engaged in
progressive, yet cautious mobilization that eventually led to the “Repeal
377A” movement in 2007, when the issue of possibly removing Section
377A came before Parliament during its reform of the Penal Code.61 The
repeal movement, however, spurred a backlash from a small yet vocal
religious minority62 that cited the traditional Asian values of the ethnically
Chinese majority population as needing protection against neocolonial
pressures from the morally over-permissive West. 63 The Singaporean
boundaries of political norms at the same time that they toe the line.”). See also Chua, supra note 43, at
719 (“To ensure survival, activists often avoid antagonizing the authoritarian state.”).
56
COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 30, at 19 (“[T]he idea of a ‘crisis of
survival’ is periodically constructed in order to revive the legitimacy for repressive interventions.”).
57
MOBILIZING GAY SINGAPORE, supra note 27, at 154.
58
Id. at 146 (“Whereas the strategy and tactics of Stonewall and gay liberation drew from a decade
of civil rights protests, black militancy, campus demonstrations, and the rise of the New Left in the United
States, the pragmatic resistance of Singapore’s gay movement was born of strategic adaption to almost fifty
years of single-party, authoritarian rule in the postcolonial state.”).
59
See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF
GAY RIGHTS (2002); see also Kees Waaldijk, Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got
Paved in the Netherlands, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL,
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 437–68 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andens eds., 2001); Ho, supra
note 16, at 6–9.
60
See Ho, supra note 16, at 7 (“[T]he decriminalization of consensual same-sex intimacy occurs
first.”).
61
See Chua, supra note 43, at 735 (2012); see generally COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND
DEMOCRACY, supra note 30.
62
See Jianlin Chen, Singapore’s Culture War Over Section 377A: Through the Lens of Public
Choice and Multilingual Research 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 106 (2013); see also Chua, supra note 43, at
736.
63
See Stewart Chang, The Postcolonial Problem for Global Gay Rights, 32 B.U. INT’L L.J. 309,
344–45 (2014).
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government reacted with its typical stance of illiberal pragmatism for the
sake of social stability. This resulted in a limited compromise where the
Prime Minister stipulated to allowing Section 377A to officially remain the
law while indicating that the Singaporean government would not be
proactive in enforcement against private gay conduct.64 On the one hand,
the Singaporean government was being sensitive to the role of gay rights in
promoting a tolerant atmosphere to attract Western business and
investment.65 On the other hand, the Singaporean government did not want
to disturb the social stability of the status quo,66 which led to the pragmatic
decision to retain Section 377A. In the interest of stability and continued
economic growth, the government tried to allay both sides.67
Following the 2007 decision by Parliament to retain Section 377A, the
gay community began to strategize on how to formally challenge the law.68
The process evolved into a two-prong approach that eventually coincided
and further resembled Western incrementalist strategies. Gay rights
advocates started thinking about a formal legal challenge in the courts of
law.69 Yet, realizing that the vast majority of Singaporeans did not support
homosexuality,70 the gay community began a public relations campaign to
64

Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (22 October 2007) vol 83 at col 2469–72.
Holning Lau, Human Rights and Globalization: Putting the Race to the Top in Perspective, 102
NW. U. L. REV. 319, 320 (2008) (“In April 2007, for example, Lee Kuan Yew—Singapore’s founding
father, who remains a highly influential cabinet member—recommended gradually reforming the citystate’s criminalization of same-sex sexual relationships. Lee’s reasoning was more economic than
normative. He did not focus on the liberty, equality, or dignity of Singapore’s sexual orientation minorities.
Rather, he focused on the fact that reforming Singapore’s staid image is necessary to attract foreign
investment and educated immigrants who can further develop Singapore as a hub for science, technology,
and financial services.”).
66
See e.g., Tessa Wong, Singapore Dilemma: When Diversity Policy Meets Local Law, BBC (June
14, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27584565 (last visited Nov. 15, 2014) (“News of [an
event at Goldman Sachs to recruit LGBT employees] caused enough handwringing that Minister for Social
and Family Development Chan Chun Sing publicly expressed concern. While discrimination had ‘no place
in our society’, foreign companies should ‘respect local culture and context’ and ‘not venture into public
advocacy for causes that sow discord among Singaporeans,’ he said.”).
67
See Meredith L. Weiss, Diversity, Rights, and Rigidity in Singapore, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 625, 638 (2011) (“The government’s efforts to shift its stance toward gays and lesbians–the better to
lure the creative class—ultimately sparked rights claims in two directions: first, from or on behalf of LGBT
Singaporeans, and second, from Christians (and to a less vocal extent, Muslims) demanding the state
maintain standards of morality and ‘family values.’”); see also Meredith L. Weiss, Rejection as Freedom?
HIV/AIDS Organizations and Identity, 4 PERS. ON POLS. 671, 675 (2006) (“Singapore will find homophobic
repression increasingly at odds with cultivating a hip, metropolitan image as well as inconvenient for public
health purposes. Regardless, the still-powerful government is reluctant to loosen an anxiously
heteronormative order over much (not least for practical reasons like fear of declining birthrates) and most
Singaporeans remain chary of nudging ill-defined ‘OB’(out-of-bounds) markers.”).
68
See MOBILIZING GAY SINGAPORE, supra note 27, at 118–19.
69
Id.
70
A recent official survey confirmed the long-held understanding that the majority of Singaporeans
did not approve of homosexuality. See Chun Han Wong, Is Some Talk Too Gay For Singapore?, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 6 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/searealtime/2014/02/06/sexuality-faqs-spark-gay-debate-in65
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positively change public opinion. Since the culturally conservative majority
was cited as the reason for retaining the law, 71 advocates adopted an
incrementalist approach of increasing positive visibility of the gay
population in hope of securing greater acceptance from the majority
population.72 The gay community embraced nationalism and modeled their
movement after characteristically Singaporean cultural tenets of nonconfrontation, social stability, and abiding by the laws.73
The public relations campaign culminated in the creation of an annual
event called Pink Dot.74 The event represents gay activism within the rules
of the illiberal state. In 2000, the Singaporean government designated an
area in a public space, Hong Lim Park, as exempt from typical licensing
requirements for public speeches and assembly. Individuals desiring to
utilize the space in Hong Lim Park under the exemption needed only to
register in advance with the police and agree to limit their speech to avoid
“caus[ing] feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility between different
racial or religious groups in Singapore.”75 In 2008, the government renewed
and extended this exemption to include performances and exhibitions. This
allowed the gay community to organize its first Pink Dot gathering as a
sanctioned event in May 2009.76 The event drew around 2,500 participants,
and helped promote the image of Singaporean gays as law-abiding and
community-oriented.77
singapore/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2014) (“A survey completed in April of 2013 by Singapore’s Institute of
Policy Studies showed that 78% of 4,131 respondents (mostly citizens) felt that sexual relations between
two adults of the same sex is ‘always wrong/almost always wrong,’ compared to only 11% who felt that it
is ‘not wrong most of the time/not wrong at all.’”).
71
Tan, supra note 30, at 78 (“[I]t is the government that hails Singaporeans as a conservative
majority forming the bedrock of national identity, which is presented nearly always as unstable and
threatened by the ineluctable forces of globalization. By constructing the conservative majority as an
unquestionable—even valuable—given, the government claims its moral authority to continue exercising
power in a paternalistic, perfectionist, and thoroughly persuasive manner, all performed in their name.”).
72
See ESKRIDGE, supra note 59, at 148 (“A process that is incremental and persuades people or their
representatives of the acceptability or even desirability of minority rights is much more likely to stick. The
incremental process will take a lot longer, but it will be more lasting.”); see also William N. Eskridge Jr.,
Backlash Politics: How Constitutional Litigation Has Advanced Marriage Equality in the United States, 93
B.U. L. REV. 275 (2013).
73
See Chua, supra note 43, at 726–28.
74
See id. at 737–38.
75
MOBILIZING GAY SINGAPORE, supra note 27, at 80.
76
Sharanjit Leyl, Singapore Gays in First Public Rally, BBC (May 17, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8054402.stm (last visited Nov. 15, 2015) (Pink Dot became possible
“after Singapore loosened law on public gatherings last year. Currently any gathering can be held that does
not touch on topics of race or religion.”).
77
See id. (“According to Jack Soh, [one of the organizers of Pink Dot,] there was no overt political
message being sent to the government. It was not a protest or a political rally. The event was for
Singaporeans in general—to affirm our respect for diversity and the freedom to love, regardless of sexual
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The Constitutional Challenges to Section 377A

Not long after the first Pink Dot, an incident emerged that provided
the possibility of a constitutional challenge of Section 377A in the courts,
but eventually created potential internal tensions for the gay movement in
Singapore. In March 2010, Tan Eng Hong was arrested for having oral sex
with another man in a public restroom stall in a shopping mall and charged
under Section 377A. Tan hired activist attorney M. Ravi to challenge the
constitutionality of Section 377A.78 The gay community reacted with mixed
feelings. Some looked forward to finally challenging a patently offensive
law that Parliament had tacitly assured would not be enforced.79 Yet others
reacted with more apprehension given the circumstances of Tan’s arrest.80
For example, upon news of Tan’s constitutional challenge, People Like Us,
one of the pioneering gay advocacy groups in Singapore, 81 issued this
statement:
People Like Us do[es] not condone sex in public spaces where
conflict with other members of society can occur. At no time
do we say that these should not be prosecutable offences. We
have however long held the view that should the State wish to
prosecute, it should do so using gender-neutral laws, so that
whether the specifics are same-sex or opposite-sex, there is
parity in treatment.82
With this statement, People Like Us attempted to distance gay identity from
the moral implications of the Tan Eng Hong incident. By doing so,
however, People Like Us was also legitimizing the rule of law so long as
orientation. ‘We recognise that many Singaporeans are conservative . . . so we planned an inclusive event
that would reach all Singaporeans, straight and gay,’ Mr. Soh says.”).
78
Rajah & Thiruvengadam, supra note 53, at 668.
79
See MOBILIZING GAY SINGAPORE, supra note 27, at 135.
80
See George Baylon Radics, Decolonizing Singapore’s Sex Laws: Tracing Section 377A of
Singapore’s Penal Code, 45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 93 (2013) (“The local gay community, popular
bloggers, and leaders all criticized Ivan [Tan Eng Hong’s English name] and his lawyer for pushing
forward, and the other man who was caught in the toilet stall with Ivan dropped the case. Ivan continued,
despite the criticism and pressure he faced from his friends, family and community and never claimed that
he was pursuing the case for anyone but himself. He harbors some resentment over the way the system
treated him and believes that things can improve.”).
81
See Russell Heng, Tiptoe Out of the Closet: The Before and After of the Increasingly Visible Gay
Community in Singapore, 40 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 81 (2001).
82
On the Prosecution of Mr. Tan Eng Hong Under Section 377A and the Challenge to the Law’s
Constitutionality, PEOPLE LIKE US (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.plu.sg/society/?p=169 (last visited Nov. 15,
2014).
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there was equal application of the law.83 For some Singaporean gay activists
who had been endeavoring to challenge the stereotypes of gays as sexual
deviants with campaigns like Pink Dot, Tan Eng Hong represented the bad
queer image they were seeking to avoid.84
Tan Eng Hong’s constitutional challenge occurred over two stages:
first as a matter of standing, and later on the substantive merits. In October
2010, the Attorney General dropped the Section 377A charge against Tan,
charged him instead under the public obscenity statute, and moved to
dismiss the constitutional challenge to Section 377A due to lack of
standing.85 The trial court granted the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss,
and the Singaporean High Court affirmed the trial court decision on appeal.86
However, in August 2012, the Singaporean Court of Appeal overturned the
decision, ruling that Tan had standing to sue based on the “real and credible
threat of prosecution under an allegedly unconstitutional law.”87 The Court
of Appeal remanded the case to the High Court to decide the merits of the
equal protection and liberty challenges,88 and set forth a two-prong test to
determine the equal protection issue.89
Tan Eng Hong’s challenge paved the way for incrementalist activists
to mount their own challenge.90 As a result of the ruling on standing, the
Singaporean gay community was able to mobilize and offer another case to
challenge Section 377A, even without an arrest or prosecution. Gary Lim
Meng Suang and Kenneth Chee, a committed gay couple who had been
together for over 15 years, filed their case in November 2012.91 They
primarily argued that Section 377A was a violation of equal protection.
Compared to Tan Eng Hong’s more unseemly criminal case, Lim and
Chee’s constitutional challenge represented a more media-friendly test case
83
Id. (saying that “People Like Us do not condone sex in public spaces” but calling for “genderneutral laws” and “parity in treatment”).
84
Radics, supra note 80, at 97.
85
Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at paras. 6–7.
86
Id. at para. 8.
87
Tan Eng Hong v. Attorney General (Tan Eng Hong I) [2012] S.G.C.A. 45, at para. 115.
88
The Court of Appeal, however, dismissed the Article 14 Freedom of Association challenge. See id.
at para. 130 (“Section 377A does not violate any of the three limbs of Art 14(1). Even if any Art 14(1)
rights are engaged by [Section] 377A, these rights are expressly stated to be subject to the need to preserve
(inter alia) public order (see Art 14(2)(a)–14(2)(c)). In so far as [Section] 377A criminalises ‘gross
indecency’ between males in public, the public order rationale applies. The same rationale applies to
preserve the constitutionality of [Section] 294(a), which criminalises ‘any obscene act in any public place.’
In so far as [Section] 377A also criminalises ‘gross indecency’ between male homosexuals in private but
does not criminalise the same between female homosexuals, this is more properly dealt with under Art 12
rather than under Art 14.”).
89
Id. at para. 185.
90
Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at para. 10.
91
Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73.
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that better fit the careful and deliberate strategy of pragmatic resistance
employed by the gay community in Singapore. Despite the ostracization of
Tan Eng Hong by incrementalists, Lim and Chee’s challenge would not have
been possible without Tan’s lawsuit on the issue of standing.
The emergence of two separate cases with two distinct strategies
reveals the rift in Singaporean gay advocacy across the good gay and bad
queer dichotomy. Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee employed a strategy that
scaled back on the legal arguments made by Tan Eng Hong.92 Tan based his
challenge against Section 377A on both equal protection and individual
liberty interests.93 Tan’s case included libertarian principles that contest
state repression of gay conduct as infringements on individual liberty.94 Lim
and Chee, however, mounted their case purely on equal protection grounds
and adopted a more accomodationist strategy of portraying gay couples as
similar to and wanting the same treatment as other law-abiding heterosexual
citizens.95 The two cases also revealed a segregated hierarchy within the gay
community in Singapore in terms of shaping public perception of gays in the
illiberal state. Whereas Tan’s challenge experienced very little support and
at times opposition from the community, Lim and Chee’s case was met with
overwhelming public support and media attention.96
Tan’s marginalization was likely caused by multiple intersecting
issues that reflect the challenges of gay advocacy within Singapore’s
illiberal democracy. First, he was appealing a criminal case, which not only
perpetuated the image of the bad queer but also offended the rule of law
sensibilities of the general populace who are structurally conditioned to not
92

Tan Eng Hong’s challenge contained both an Article 9 liberty and an Article 12 equal protection
arguments, while Lim and Chee’s challenge contained focused on the Article 12 equal protection argument.
See Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 19-20; Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at para.19. It should be
noted, however, that the personal liberty interest was less directly at stake in the Lim and Chee case
because there was no actual arrest made and thus no outstanding habeas corpus issue. See id. at para. 7.
93
See Tan Eng Hong II, S.G.C.A. 45, at para. 6 (arguing that 377A not only violated Article 12(1),
but also Articles 9 and 14 of the Singapore Constitution, which provide for liberty and freedom of
association). See also Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1965) Art 12(1) (“All persons are equal
before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law.”); id. at Art 9(1) (“No person shall be
deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law.”); id. at Art 14(1) (providing that “(a)
every citizen of Singapore has the right to freedom of speech and expression; (b) all citizens of Singapore
have the right to assemble peaceably and without arms; and (c) all citizens of Singapore have the right to
form associations.”).
94
See Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 21.
95
See Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at para. 1 (arguing that 377A violated of Article 12(1) of the
Singapore Constitution, which provides for equal protection).
96
Radics, supra note 80, at 95 (“At a recent book launch, Ravi described Tan’s case as even more
difficult than challenging the death penalty because of a lack of public support. In contrast, Singapore
responded to Lim and Chee’s case with overwhelming support. Lim and Chee have successfully solicited
online donations for their legal costs and have received technical support to create a seven-minute video
that outlines their case.”).

JANUARY 2015

GAY LIBERATION IN THE ILLIBERAL STATE

17

question the legitimacy of the rules.97 His challenge was more libertarian in
nature—which, by definition, is critical of government interference—and
thus represented more drastic and radical activism that did not resonate with
the majority of Singaporeans.98 Up to that point, gay activists had adopted
the cultural norm of working within the system.99 In contrast, Tan Eng
Hong’s attorney, M. Ravi, was prominently known as an activist with a
record of confronting the government on controversial issues.100 There may
have been concern that the association of gay rights with such a figure risked
drawing the attention of an illiberal government known for quickly quashing
voices of dissent.101 In this regard, Tan Eng Hong’s case may have been
seen as counteracting the deliberately slow and careful strategy of pragmatic
resistance that Professor Lynette Chua describes as “seek[ing] to advance
the movement while ensuring that it survives the scrutiny and potential
retaliation of authoritarian rulers.”102
Hoping that his case would not be overshadowed and subsumed by
the more sympathetic challenge brought by Lim and Chee, Tan attempted to
have the two cases treated together.103 The High Court, however, did not
comply. The High Court’s decision in Lim Meng Suang v. Attorney
General came first. In April 2013, Judge Quentin Loh issued a decision
upholding Section 377A as not violating equal protection.104 In August
2013, still awaiting a decision, Tan Eng Hong applied with the Court to join

97
See Mutalib, supra note 24, at 313, 325 (describing a system of illiberal governmental control in
Singapore that includes “regulation of all key institutions of the state apparatus such as the bureaucracy,
grass roots organisations, trade unions and mass media, and co-opting leaders to oversee these institutions”;
“periodic changes to the Constitution which radically transform the Republic’s electoral and parliamentary
systems, such as the introduction of the NCMPS, NMPS, EP and GRCS”; “punitive actions against
opposition and public dissent in general which has resulted in the perceived ‘climate of fear’ that haunts the
citizenry and the concomitant ‘subject’ political culture in Singapore”).
98
Id. at 325–26 (“The Republic’s traditional immigrant and clan mentality, which continues to
influence the psyche of the majority Chinese populace (whose emphasis on financial and material pursuits
is universally known), and the lack of a developed competitive political tradition given the Republic's short
period of nationhood, has created a generation of Singaporeans who do not know, let alone are capable of
fathoming, some other style of governance than the PAP.”).
99
COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 30, at 150 (“From the movement’s
timorous beginnings to its coming out, activists continued to interact with formal law and the political norm
of legal legitimacy as important factors that shape their tactics.”).
100
Rajah & Thiruvengadam, supra note 53, at 661–69.
101
See Mutalib, supra note 24, at 325.
102
See MOBILIZING GAY SINGAPORE, supra note 27.
103
See Radics, supra note 80, at 90 (“Initially, there was some concern that his case would be
dismissed given the pending constitutional challenge by Lim and Chee . . . [G]iven the similarity of the two
challenges, Tan respectfully asked the High Court to issue both opinions at the same time.”).
104
See Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73.
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the Lim and Chee appeal as an interested party.105 Lim and Chee objected to
Tan joining their case, which further emphasized their divide, both
philosophically and personally. Tan eventually acquiesced to Lim and Chee
and dropped his motion to join when the Court assured him that his case
would be decided.106 Tan Eng Hong awaited the decision in his case over the
summer. That summer, gay activists’ attentions were split simultaneously
between mustering an appeal to Judge Loh’s decision in Lim Meng Suang
and organizing the fifth annual Pink Dot event, which had been steadily
growing and garnering support over the years. Since many of the organizers
of Pink Dot were the same activists garnering support for the Lim and Chee
appeal, it is no surprise that the two actions converged into a concerted
effort. To increase public visibility of the constitutional challenge, the Pink
Dot organizers set Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee as their flag bearers for the
event in 2013.107
In contrast, the Pink Dot organizers purposefully distanced their event
from Tan Eng Hong, even though the High Court decision on his
constitutional challenge was imminent.108 His exclusion from Pink Dot
created a small controversy within the local gay community, with some
critics condemning the discrimination that was occurring within the gay
community itself.109 Critics argued that the gay community was diverse and
reflected a multiplicity of identities across the good gay and bad queer
spectrum.110 For them, the face of gay Singapore was being misrepresented
for the sake of mainstream acceptance.111 Gay individuals who were more
like Tan Eng Hong than Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee experienced further
marginalization—even their own community treated them as invisible. This
further perpetuated the growing governmental and public stance that some
forms of gay expression were unacceptable. Pink Dot and its incrementalist
brand of gay sensibility, in contrast, steadily saw increasing acceptability
among Singaporeans, growing to a 21,000 attendance in 2013, and 26,000 in
105
Andrea Ong, Man in Gay-Sex Law Challenge Applies to Join Separate Appeal, STRAITS TIMES
(Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.straitstimes.com/breaking-news/singapore/story/man-gay-sex-law-challengeapplies-join-separate-appeal-20130814 (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).
106
See Selena Lum, Gay-Sex Law Case: Man Drops Bid to Intervene, STRAITS TIMES (Sept. 8, 2013),
http://news.asiaone.com/news/singapore/gay-sex-law-case-man-drops-bid-intervene (last visited Nov. 15,
2014).
107
See Radics, supra note 80, at 96.
108
See id. at 96–97.
109
See id. at 97.
110
See, e.g., Nicholas Leow, Why I would liked to have worn pink but couldn’t, Online Citizen (July 3,
2013), http://www.s3raph.com/2013/07/03/why-i-would-like-to-have-worn-pink-but-couldnt/ (last visited
Nov. 15, 2014)
111
See, e.g, id.
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2014.112 This represents a tenfold increase in just five years since inception.
Pink Dot has not only gained growing community support over the years,
but it has also attracted sponsorship from multinational corporations as
well.113
Judge Loh finally ruled on the Tan Eng Hong case in October 2013
with a decision, unsurprisingly, to uphold the constitutionality of Section
377A. After the ruling, Tan Eng Hong applied again to have his case
consolidated with the Lim and Chee appeal.114 Days later, despite the
objections of the Attorney General and the attorney for Lim and Chee,
Deborah Barker, the Court of Appeal ruled that it would consolidate the
appeals and treat them together.115 After consolidation, Lim and Chee’s
attorney framed the Article 9 liberty issue as one of privacy, which
“include[s] a right of personal autonomy allowing a person to enjoy and
express affection and love towards another human being.” 116 By
characterizing the liberty interest as one of privacy and intimacy, she
differentiated her clients as good gays in comparison to Tan Eng Hong as the
bad queer.
The Court of Appeal’s decision to consolidate the cases created a
situation where Singapore became positioned to accomplish what Lawrence
did not: acknowledge that good gays and bad queers are cut of the same
cloth and should not be segregated differently in society. The Court of
Appeal issued its decision on the consolidated case in October 2014, and
upheld Section 377A.117 The Court initially recognized that Lim and Chee
were making a different liberty argument than Tan Eng Hong,118 yet in the
112

Dominique Mosbergen, Refusing to Be Silenced, Thousands Come Out for Singapore’s ‘Pink Dot’
LGBT Rights Rally, HUFFINGTON POST (June 28, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/28/
singapore-pink-dot_n_5539810.html.
113
See Wong, supra note 66 (“[M]ore multinational companies are stepping up to publicly support
Singapore’s annual gay rights event, Pink Dot, happening on 28 June [2014]. Gay sex is banned in
Singapore, but companies including Google, Barclays, J P Morgan, Goldman Sachs and BP are on board as
corporate supporters for what has become the city-state’s biggest annual gathering organised by civil
society.”).
114
See Terry Xu, S377A—Tan Eng Hong Will Have His Day in Court, ONLINE CITIZEN (Oct. 10,
2013), http://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2013/10/s377a-tan-eng-hong-will-have-his-day-in-court/.
115
Amanda Lee, Appeals Against S377A Ruling to Be Heard Together, STRAITS TIMES (Oct. 10,
2013), http://www.straitstimes.com/breaking-news/singapore/story/appeals-two-section-377a-challengeswill-be-heard-together-20131010?page=2#sthash.QXH1W3rF.dpuf; see also Lum, supra note 19.
116
Lim Meng Suang and Kenneth Chee Mun-Leon v. Attorney General (Lim Meng Suang II) [2014]
S.G.C.A. 53, at para. 29.
117
See Lim Meng Suang II, S.G.C.A. 53.
118
Id. at para. 43 (“The arguments raised by Mr. Ravi and by Ms. Barker on Art 9 in the present
appeals are different. Ms Barker argues that the right to life and personal liberty under Art 9(1) should
include a limited right to privacy and personal autonomy allowing a person to enjoy and express affection
and love towards another human being. Mr. Ravi, on the other hand, contends that [Section] 377A is vague,
arbitrary and absurd.”).
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end combined them into one and the same.119 The Court rejected the liberty
argument on both fronts, and maintained that the true question “brings us
back (in substance at least) to the issue of whether or not s 377A ought to
enforce broader societal morality.”120
More importantly, the Court of Appeal rejected Lim and Chee’s
attempt to characterize the original purpose of Section 377A as punishing
bad queers, specifically male prostitutes, and therefore inapplicable to a
private consensual relationship such as their own. Deborah Barker, counsel
for Lim and Chee, argued that the primary purpose of Section 377A was “to
combat the problem of male prostitution…[and] applying [Section] 377A to
categories outside the narrow category just mentioned (viz., male
prostitution) would be over-inclusive and, hence, unconstitutional.”121 The
Court of Appeal, however, refused to accept the distinction. It ruled that the
original intent of Section 377A “covered all situations relating to ‘acts of
gross indecency’ between males, [and] it would follow that similar situations
involving male prostitutes would also be covered on an a fortiori basis.”122
The Court of Appeal ultimately ruled that this underlying public morality
purpose of Section 377A was an issue that could only be overturned by the
legislature.123 By collapsing the range of gay sexuality, both legitimized and
delegitimized, into one case, the Court of Appeal called upon the legislature
and Singaporean society to consider homosexuality across the spectrum, not
just when it looks heterosexual.
III.

GAY SKIN, ASIAN MASKS: SEGREGATING PRIVATE IDENTITY FROM
PUBLIC VISIBILITY AND TWO FACES FOR GAY RIGHTS IN SINGAPORE

A.

Lim Meng Suang and the Pitfalls of Equal Protection in the Illiberal
State

The competing strategies in both challenges to Section 377A illustrate
the tensions between sexual identity and national identity within Singapore’s
hybridized form of democracy, where rights seem incomplete when
compared to the more expansive rights of citizens in full democracies. Like
the Texas statute that was overturned in Lawrence v. Texas, Section 377A
119

Id. at para. 53 (“Mr, Ravi’s argument [on the absurdity of Section 377A] here closely resembles
Ms. Barker’s argument that ‘personal liberty’ in Art 9(1) should be interpreted to include a limited right to
privacy and personal autonomy. For the results given above, Mr. Ravi’s argument in this particular guise
must likewise be rejected.”).
120
Id. at para. 49.
121
Id. at para. 131.
122
Id. at para. 148.
123
Id. at para. 79.
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prohibits sodomy only between homosexuals and not heterosexuals. 124
Thus, as in Lawrence, there was a compelling argument for the government
to strike down the statute on equal protection grounds.125 Lim and Chee’s
case specifically raised the point that Section 377A prohibits homosexual
men from engaging in behavior that is lawful between heterosexual couples
and lesbian couples.126 Lim and Chee referenced Lawrence, among other
foreign precedents, as a model for striking down the law.127 However, equal
protection in Singapore evolved somewhat differently than in Western
democracies. As Professor Kevin Tan explains, in Singapore “the law
recognizes the need for a state to discriminate between its subjects. In itself,
discrimination is neither morally objectionable nor unlawful.”128 Rather,
“the key to legal discrimination is the concept of classification . . . the idea
of ‘equal before the law’ and ‘equal protection under the law’ was that of
equal justice.”129
To determine whether Section 377A violated equal protection, the
Singapore Court of Appeal set forth an “intelligible differentia” test for the
High Court to apply on remand, where “a differentiating measure prescribed
by legislation would be consistent with Art 12(1) only if: (a) the
classification was founded on an intelligible differentia; and (b) the
differentia bore a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
law in question.”130 The test prescribed by the Court of Appeal indicates
rational review, an older standard of equal protection that preceded the strict
scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny standards developed in the United
States,131 but different from the form of rational review ambiguously utilized
in Lawrence. 132 The traditional form of rational review, which is also
124

Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) s 337(A) (“Any male person who, in public or private,
commits, or abets the commission of, or procures or attempts to procure the commission by any male
person of, any act of gross indecency with another male person, shall be punished with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to 2 years.”); see also Douglas Sanders, 377 and the Unnatural Afterlife of British
Colonialism in Asia, 4 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1, 16–17 (2009).
125
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579–85 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
126
Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at para. 24.
127
See Chang, supra note 63, at 328.
128
KEVIN TAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN SINGAPORE 156 (2011).
129
Id.
130
Tan Eng Hong I, S.G.C.A. 45, at para. 124.
131
See, e.g., Jack Lee Tsen-Ta, Equal Protection and Sexual Orientation, 16 SING. L. REV. 228, 231
(1995) (“Rational review may be termed the ‘traditional’ standard of review. It was the earliest to be
applied and is evident in all four jurisdictions [the United States, India, Malaysia and Singapore]. It is
apparently the sole standard of review in India. On the other hand, American courts have gone on to
develop heightened standards of review in the form of strict scrutiny, and more recently, intermediate
review.”).
132
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Tribe, supra note 7, at
1916.
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employed in other postcolonial Commonwealth countries such as India and
Malaysia, prohibits legislation against a class but allows for reasonable
classification between persons.133
In applying the first prong of the rational review test in Lim Meng
Suang, Judge Loh agreed with the Attorney General’s interpretation and
found intelligible differentia for Section 377A based on gender.134 Judge
Loh ruled that the intelligible differentia of Section 377A covered acts of
gross indecency between males but not gross indecency between males and
females or between females. 135 Judge Loh stated that “Parliament, in
dealing with the issues arising within and without the country, is entitled to
pass laws that deal with, inter alia, the myriad of problems that arise from
the inherent inequality and differences pervading society.”136 Judge Loh’s
ruling is consistent with Professor Tan’s description of Singaporean
tolerance of discrimination between subjects where “legislative
discrimination or selective application of the law [is] necessary to deal with
‘the complex problems arising out of an infinite variety of human
relations.’”137
Judge Loh’s reasoning also indicates the general deference to public
order and social stability as overriding interests in illiberal pragmatic
governance.138 In applying the second prong of the intelligible differentia
test, Judge Loh ruled that the differentiation bore a rational relation to the
object sought in the original 1938 legislation, identified as a direct response
to the prevalence of gross indecent acts between males.139 In respect to the
argument that gay men were being treated differently from women, Judge
Loh noted that in 1938, there was little concern with female gross indecency,
133

See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV.
341, 344 (1949) (“The Constitution does not require that things different in fact be treated in law as though
they were the same. But it does require, in its concern for equality, that those who are similarly situated be
similarly treated. The measure of the reasonableness of a classification is the degree of its success in
treating similarly those similarly situated.”).
134
See Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at paras. 28, 48.
135
See id. at para. 48.
136
Id. at para. 44.
137
TAN, supra note 128, at 156 (quoting Public Prosecutor v. Su Liang Yu [1976] 2 MLJ 128
(Malay.)).
138
See Li-ann Thio, Lex Rex or Rex Lex? Competing Conceptions of the Rule of Law in Singapore, 20
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 53 (2002) (“Singapore retains an array of laws allowing the curtailment of
individual liberties without judicial redress so as to serve the imperative of the broadly defined idea of
‘public order.’”).
139
Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at para. 67 (“The act of males engaging in grossly indecent acts
with other males was to be criminalised. The prevalence of such acts was a regrettable state of affairs and
was not desirable. It was necessary to strengthen the criminal law and enable it to prosecute males engaging
in such grossly indecent acts even if the acts were committed in private. This was because the then
prevailing law made it difficult to detect and prosecute such acts.”).
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which is consistent with the then contemporaneous European tradition of
viewing male homosexual behavior as being more aggressive and
transgressive than female homosexual behavior.140 Again, the justification
for the law centers on public order and social stability.
Professor Yap Po Jen suggests that Judge Loh’s ruling overly fixated
on the 1938 rationale for the law with little regard to the evolution of its
intent over time.141 However, as this author has previously written, even
though attitudes regarding homosexuality in the former colonial power had
since liberalized, Singapore resisted similar international pressure to
conform. Instead, Singapore nationalistically vaunted its conservative Asian
values as part of its postcolonial identity, even though the anti-gay position
retained specters of the colonial past. 142 In this respect, Judge Loh
specifically tied the conservativism of the present, as reflected in the 2007
Parliamentary debates, to the same conservativism of the colonial past.143 In
the end, Judge Loh ruled that the continued moral conservatism of the
majority constituted a valid state interest satisfying the second prong of the
rational review test. 144 Judge Loh’s justification relied largely on
Parliament’s concern with maintaining a balance between adopting certain
Westernized values for the sake of economic growth while not upsetting the
status quo for a conservative, postcolonial population.145 In Tan Eng Hong,
140

See Robert G. Moeller, “The Homosexual Man Is a ‘Man,’ the Homosexual Woman Is a
‘Woman’”: Sex, Society, and the Law in Postwar West Germany, 4 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 395 (1994).
141
See Yap Po Jen, Section 377A and Equal Protection in Singapore: Back to 1938?, 25 SING. ACAD.
L.J. 630 (2013).
142
Chang, supra note 63, at 337.
143
Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at para. 85 (“It is clear from the speeches made during the October
2007 Parliamentary Debates that the purpose of [Section] 377A has not changed from the purpose
articulated by AG Howell in 1938. After extensive consultations at all levels, the Government decided to
repeal [Section] 377 but retain [Section] 377A. Because of the Petition presented to Parliament, which
called for the repeal of [Section] 377A, the debate over the abolition or retention of this provision took
place and in fact overshadowed the rest of the proposed amendments to the 1985 Penal Code. The reason
for [Section] 377A’s retention, which affirmed the purpose of the provision as articulated by AG Howell in
1938, was that Singapore was a conservative society where the majority did not accept homosexuality.”); id.
at para. 78 (“Should we look at the October 2007 Parliamentary Debates to ascertain the purpose or object
of [Section] 377A? I do not think there is a need to do so, but in any event, I found that those debates did
not assist the Plaintiffs at all. In this case, the purpose of [Section] 377A was articulated, albeit within the
context of a colonial government, when it was enacted by the Legislative Council in 1938. Section 377A
was considered again some 69 years later, and it was decided that the provision should be retained even
though [Section] 377 was to be repealed. That was the view taken by Parliament in 2007. In effect, the
purpose of [Section] 377A as articulated by AG Howell in 1938, was reaffirmed by Parliament in 2007.
That purpose therefore still remains valid today.”).
144
Id. at para. 138.
145
See Tan, supra note 30, at 23–44 (“Nation building, therefore, took the form of preserving private
spheres where these eternal ‘Asian’ ethnicities could flourish and provide the deeper historical, cultural,
and moral resources for a stable and substantial overarching Singaporean identity. In the public sphere,
there were to be secularism, equal opportunities for all, and common modes of communication and
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Judge Loh largely dispensed with the Article 12 equal protection argument
with a sweeping reference to his reasoning in Lim Meng Suang. 146
Furthermore, in its October 2014 ruling that upheld the constitutionality of
Section 377A, the Court of Appeal relied almost exclusively on colonial
moral justifications from 1938 to satisfy the second prong of the intelligible
differentia test.147
By setting rational review as the standard, the Court of Appeal also
created a limited structure for understanding equal protection for gays.
Although lesbian sex is mentioned, the first prong of the intelligible
differentia test is more centrally concerned with the question of comparing
gays to heterosexuals. 148 Finding commonality between gays and
heterosexuals is not only the chief question in Lim Meng Suang, but is also
the driving question in the incrementalist approach to gay advocacy in
Singapore, though it ultimately proves to be the wrong question. Lim and
Chee’s challenge asked the Court, and society generally, to determine
whether gays are similarly situated as heterosexuals, and therefore should be
treated the same. Tan’s case asked the Court to additionally determine
whether, even if gays are treated differently than heterosexuals, they should
also be treated as criminals. By including additional liberty arguments, the
Tan challenge imagined that a solution to Section 377A must ultimately
exist outside the rational review structure set by the Court of Appeal in the
standing case. To accomplish this, Tan combined his liberty claim with
equal protection under a larger natural law umbrella, which Judge Loh
hesitantly agreed to engage in upon appeal.149 Like Pink Dot, the Lim and
Chee lawsuit employed a strategy that abides within the legal structure
provided, whereas Tan Eng Hong challenged the validity of the structure
itself.

participation. The public sphere would be the ‘common space’ that with time and collective confidence
should increase as Singaporeans give priority to their national over their ethnic identities.”).
146
Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at paras. 85–86.
147
Lim Meng Suang II. S.G.C.A. 53, at paras. 117-152.
148
Tan Eng Hong I, S.G.C.A. 45, at para. 126.
149
Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 20 (“I am compelled to consider the Natural Justice Issue
because Mr Ravi has framed this issue in such a way that it does not fall outside the litigation boundary
delineated by the Court of Appeal in Tan Eng Hong v. Attorney General [2012] SGCA 45. It will be
recalled that the Court of Appeal found that if s 377A was void for violating the right to equality before the
law and equal protection of the law under Art 12(1) and therefore unconstitutional, the Plaintiff’s rights
under Art 9(1) would be engaged on the facts of this particular case since his arrest and detention under s
377A had deprived him of his personal liberty.”).
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Tan Eng Hong and the Liberty Critique of Authoritarian Rule of Law

Tan Eng Hong’s challenge was fundamentally more confrontational
than Lim and Chee’s case because it argued that Section 377A subverts the
rule of law, 150 a foundational principle upon which the Singaporean
government bases its authority.151 Tan’s attorney, M. Ravi, argued that in
order to be legitimate, the rule of law must rely on more than simple formal
validity and reflect larger overarching principles of natural justice.152 Equal
application of the laws is not enough if the laws are invalid in the first place.
Ravi’s argument suggests that equal protection is insufficient without
confronting more foundational liberty principles, so that if Section 377A “is
found to contravene the fundamental rules of natural justice and is,
accordingly, not ‘law’, the Plaintiff’s arrest and detention under that section
would have resulted in a deprivation of his personal liberty in a manner
which was not justified by any law, and would have been
unconstitutional.”153
M. Ravi specifically expanded equal protection into a larger rule of
law argument involving liberty. He tied the prohibited conduct to
fundamental identity, arguing that Section 377A was criminalizing a
“natural and immutable attribute.”154 Normally, an immutable trait is used
as a factor in determining indicia of a suspect class in applying American
strict scrutiny review,155 a standard not followed by Singapore or even the
United States in respect to gay rights. Although Ravi did argue for a
heightened standard of review,156 citing recommendations from Professor
Jack Lee,157 this was not the main point behind his use of immutability. He
couched immutability not solely within an equal protection framework but
instead within his broader argument that Section 377A violates the rule of
law, which touches on both equal protection and fundamental liberty.158
Judge Loh reduced Ravi’s point to a question of fact,159 and created a factual
impasse by situating the problem within a battle of experts.160 However,
150

Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 21.
See generally Thio, supra note 138, at 53.
152
Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 22(a).
153
Id. at para. 21.
154
Id. at para. 41.
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Lee, supra note 131, at 236.
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Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 88.
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Lee, supra note 131, at 255.
158
Tan Eng Hong I, SGHC 45, paras. 21, 22(d).
159
Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 45 (“Thus, on the Plaintiff’s own case, in order for his
argument here to succeed, he must demonstrate two facts, viz., homosexuality is inborn and unable to be
changed.”).
160
Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 63.
151
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Ravi’s immutability argument points to the ways in which conduct
constitutes expression of fundamental identity, and that illicit gay conduct is
merely symptomatic of the prohibitions against expression of gay identity.
Ravi’s citation of Professor Lee suggests how rational review is
insufficient because gays comprise a discreet and insular minority in
Singapore, largely as a result of the immutability of their identity. Although
Judge Loh rejected Ravi’s proposal for strict scrutiny, which incorporates
Lee’s reasoning, Lee’s analysis also reveals the inherent difficulty of an
incrementalist approach that led to the favorable ruling in Lawrence. Lee
starts by describing a hypothetical scenario:
If the majority has greater social contact with a minority, this
diminishes the hostility that often comes with unfamiliarity and
curbs the majority's tendency to exaggerate its superiority. The
more we get to know people who are different in some ways,
the more we begin to realise the ways in which they are the
same. This is the beginning of political co-operation.161
Lee adds, however, that this scenario has been made virtually impossible for
the gay community in Singapore. He notes that “homosexuals are
anonymous and diffuse[d] throughout the population. It is this anonymity
that makes them a discrete and insular minority. Strong prejudice against
gays compels most to remain hidden for fear of losing their reputation and
livelihood.”162
The lack of social acceptability drives gays to anonymous spaces.
Gay men develop alternative spaces because the laws foreclose the venues
for them to identify and encounter one another.163 Tan Eng Hong was
arrested precisely because the existing laws do not allow a forum for public
expression of homosexual intimacy, and he was likely forced to seek more
discreet settings for meeting potential partners. Because there are no public
spaces to explore gay sexuality due to Section 377A and the resulting
stigmas towards gay identity, gay men in Singapore must turn to semiprivate spaces such as bathroom stalls and bathhouses to encounter one
another. During the 2007 debate to repeal Section 377A, Parliament
161

Lee, supra note 131, at 243.
Id.
163
Yap, supra note 141, at 635 (“If the State is seeking to argue that the object to be achieved by s
377A is to reduce HIV infection in Singapore by discouraging reckless male homosexual activity, one then
has to examine whether the criminalisation of same- sex male intercourse would be effective in achieving
this goal or such measures would only drive the infection underground, impede legal HIV prevention
efforts, and in turn increase net HIV infection in the country.”).
162
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Member Hri Kumar Nair also suggested that criminalization drives
homosexuality into underground spaces of anonymity.164
C.

Reevaluating Lawrence in Light of Lim Meng Suang and Tan Eng
Hong

A comparison of the Singapore cases allows a reevaluation of the
rationale promoted by Lawrence, and the subsequent entrenchment of
incrementalism that followed. Tan Eng Hong illustrates the circular
interconnectedness between criminalization of homosexuality, public
discrimination against gays, illicit homosexual behavior, and justifications
for the criminal sanctions against gays. This interrelationship was
significant in the decision in Lawrence to overturn the Texas anti-sodomy
statute.165 As Justice Kennedy explained, “When homosexual conduct is
made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public
and in the private spheres.”166 Lawrence hinged, however, on the fact that
Justice Kennedy found that the morality of the majority was not a valid
interest that allows for differential treatment.167
The decision could easily have come out the other way, as it did in
Singapore. The opposite ruling in the Singaporean cases challenging
Section 377A reveals the tenuousness nature of the Lawrence outcome under
its semi-rational review approach, or any standard short of strict scrutiny. If
criminalization drives public disapprobation of gay expression, and the
morality of the majority is a compelling state interest that justifies the
prohibition of gay expression, then there will always be a rational reason for
retention of Section 377A. Thus, there is a need to look beyond equal
protection, and consider protections of gay expression as an issue of
liberty.168 In this respect, the arguments raised in Tan Eng Hong provide a
164
Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (22 October 2007) vol 83 at col 2242 (Hri
Kumar Nair, Member of Parliament) (“making something illegal only forces it underground. That will
restrict the ability of the Government to respond to the HIV threat through promotion and education, when
Government agencies feel that they cannot engage with the gay community in any way except a
condemnatory one.”).
165
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
166
Id.
167
Id. at 577 (“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history
nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.” (quoting Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
168
Lee, supra note 131, at 256 (“heightened scrutiny reinforces the notion of fundamental liberties. If
some rights are established as fundamental by the Constitution, it stands to reason that everyone is entitled
to these rights before claims to non-fundamental rights can be granted.”).
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useful lens to consider the gaps left in Lawrence, and the impetus to treat
homosexuality as a matter of privacy weighed against societal morality.
Though equal protection is included in his larger natural law argument
in Tan Eng Hong, Ravi tailored a more specific rule of law challenge that
appeals to liberty, citing the landmark Singaporean habeas corpus case Chng
Suan Tze v. Minister of Home Affairs.169 Ravi cited Chng to argue that
Section 377A is an arbitrary law violating fundamental rule of law
principles.170 In Chng, the appellants Chng Suan Tze, Kevin Desmond de
Souza, Teo Soh Lung, and Wong Souk Yee were among sixteen individuals
accused of conspiring against the government and detained without trial
under the Internal Security Act (ISA) in 1987.171 The ISA conferred on the
President and Prime Minister discretionary power to detain individuals in
order to preserve public order and security.172 The government invoked the
ISA to detain the appellants for being part of a “Marxist conspiracy.”173
The appellants denied such involvement, alleging that the law was illegally
applied to prevent them from exercising their civil and political liberties.
The Chng case specifically challenged the discretionary power of the state to
suspend the liberty interests of individuals, as such discretion rises to the
level of arbitrariness.174 Although the appellants were unsuccessful at the
lower court levels, the Court of Appeal agreed with the appellants.175 In
Chng, the Court or Appeal asserted: “[T]he notion of a subjective or
unfettered discretion is contrary to the rule of law. All power has legal
limits and the rule of law demands that the courts should be able to review
the exercise of discretionary power.”176 In response to Chng, the Singapore
Parliament quickly mobilized to amend the Constitution and the ISA to
prohibit judicial review of detentions based on internal security.177
At its heart, the Chng case differentiated “rule of law” from “rule by
law,” with the former putting into question the legitimacy of the latter as an
169
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Internal Security Act (Cap 143, 1985 Rev Ed), amended by Internal Security Amendment Act (Act
2 of 1989) (adding sections 8A, 8B, 8C, and 8D); see also Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1965),
Art 149(3); see also Teo Soh Lung v. Minister for Home Affairs and others and other appeals [1988] SLR
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acceptable exercise by the illiberal state.178 Perhaps in order to expedite his
own legal conclusion, Judge Loh bundled Ravi’s application of Chng as a
simple example in his larger natural justice argument. Judge Loh refused to
recognize the distinct criticism of rule by law that Ravi tried to make: “I find
it difficult to see how Mr. Ravi’s reliance on the concept of the rule of law as
applied in Chng Suan Tze takes his case further than a singular reliance on
the fundamental rules of natural justice.”179 Judge Loh misread Ravi’s
application of Chng as a simple call for judicial review180 when Ravi was
more likely drawing a larger criticism of the rule by law system that Section
377A represents. Ravi possibly invoked Chng to reveal the inherent
contradictions of Section 377A as a product of illiberal pragmatism. The
2007 compromise to keep Section 377A as the official law but not
proactively enforce it was intended by the Prime Minister and Parliament to
maintain public order. However, that compromise instead creates disorder
by allowing Section 377A to be discretionarily applied in an arbitrary and
capricious manner. In other words, Section 377A demonstrates how the
illiberal state justifies disorder in the name of order. 181 Unsystematic
enforcement creates a seemingly arbitrary system that contradicts the rule of
law, and instead exposes it as rule by law in its rawest form.
D.

Public Visibility and the Semiotics of Queerness

Ravi argued that Section 377A is fraught with so much ambiguity and
discretion in application that it is unconstitutionally vague because it
“violates the fundamental principles of natural justice and the rule of law
which demand, among others, certainty and predictability.” 182 Ravi
178
Raja, supra note 37, at 211 (“The Court’s words hold the promise of a collaborative legal complex
mobilization, of judges uniting with lawyers to assert the ‘rule of law’ in the face of ‘rule by law’ state
practices). See also Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, Shall the Twain Never Meet? Competing Narratives and Discourses
of the Rule of Law in Singapore, SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 298, 305 (2012).
179
Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 66.
180
Id. at para. 67 (“Ostensibly, ‘rule of law’ in that context meant that the court retained the final
power to re-examine the exercise of the Executive’s discretion. The Executive was therefore subject to the
rule of law. Unlike the respondents in Chng Suan Tze, it is not the Defendant’s case in the present
proceedings that s 377A is not reviewable by the court. I am therefore unable to see how bringing in the
concept of rule of law as used by the court in Chng Suan Tze adds anything.”); Judge Loh had also confined
his reference to Chng in the Lim Meng Suang case to an analysis of judicial review. See Lim Meng Suang I,
SGHC 73, at para. 112.
181
Jothie Rajah, Punishing Bodies, Securing the Nation: How Rule of Law Can Legitimate the
Urbane Authoritarian State, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 945, 948-49 (“Just as the state has appropriated and
emasculated Westminster institutions and ideologies as “an adjunct to, rather than as a constraint against”
state authoritarianism [], so too has Singapore selectively performed emasculated facets of the rule of law,
facets that lack the core capacity to limit state power.”).
182
Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 80.
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illustrated that under Section 377A, even “kissing, holding hands, or even
merely hugging,”183 could constitute an arrestable violation. Judge Loh
dismissed this argument by reasoning:
It should be evident from the considerations which were extant
in 1938 (when the earliest predecessor of 377A was enacted)
that there is at least an arguable case that the conduct in the
hypothetical example given by Mr. Ravi would not constitute
an offence under [Section] 377A. In fact, it is quite telling that
none of the more than a hundred case authorities cited by Mr.
Ravi was of a decision by the Singapore court convicting two
males for kissing, holding hands or hugging.184
Judge Loh’s decision seems to indicate that there is some level of
predictability to the law. However, Judge Loh’s finding is inconsistent with
the original analysis of the Court of Appeal in the earlier Tan Eng Hong
standing case and its extension to Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee.
In the same way that Tan Eng Hong was granted standing to sue even
though there was no longer a prosecution pending under Section 377A, Gary
Lim and Kenneth Chee were also deemed to have standing to conduct their
own constitutional challenge based on the realistic possibility that they could
be prosecuted under Section 377A. Under the unofficial compromise of
non-enforcement, Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee likely would not have been
arrested under Section 377A. Their conduct was completely private and
consensual; exactly the type of relationship against which Parliament agreed
not to proactively enforce Section 377A. In fact, Gary Lim and Kenneth
Chee conveyed to the Court that “the real pressure which they experience on
account of their relationship seems to have been from their respective
parents, their respective families and members of society, and not from any
officer of the law.”185
Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee would not typically be arrested or
prosecuted under the law because their conduct was not necessarily public.
However, the Court of Appeal intimated that Section 377A had broad
implications beyond the type of behavior contained in Tan Eng Hong’s
situation:

183
184
185

Tan Eng Hong II, SGHC 199, at para. 82.
Id. at para. 83.
Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at para. 10.
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[W]ithout going into the merits of the Application, we want to
acknowledge that in so far as [Section] 377A in its current form
extends to private consensual sexual conduct between adult
males, this provision affects the lives of a not insignificant
portion of our community in a very real and intimate way. Such
persons might plausibly assert that the continued existence of
[Section] 377A in our statute books causes them to be
unapprehended felons in the privacy of their homes.186
Lim and Chee’s sexual conduct would not have ever been discovered
but for their admission that such conduct was taking place in private. The
Court of Appeal’s finding, however, suggests that there need not even be an
admission. Even though their sexual conduct was not in public view, the
nature of their relationship created a deduction that such conduct was taking
place privately. In other words, their relationship itself communicates the
fact that illicit conduct is occurring.
Tan Eng Hong’s attorney intimated this point in his argument. Ravi’s
example of kissing and holding hands further subverts the distinction
between seen and unseen, public and private. Ravi’s desexualized
illustration of kissing and holding hands indicates that even though those
types of conduct do not facially constitute violations of Section 377A, they
nevertheless signal private violations that could be prosecuted. Thus, Ravi’s
use of kissing and holding hands as a hypothetical suggests that Section
377A does not so much punish conduct, but really punishes identity.
Tan Eng Hong, Gary Lim, and Kenneth Chee were all subject to
discretionary prosecution under Section 377A not necessarily because their
conduct was in fact witnessed, but because their identities as gay men
marked them as presumptive violators of the law. In this respect, Ravi
indirectly raised the issue whether treating gays differently even within their
own community is productive if the law, and society, will treat unobtrusive
sex in private as equivalent to deviant sex in public.

186

Tan Eng Hong I, S.G.C.A. 45, at para. 184.
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The Singaporean government’s unofficial non-enforcement of Section
377A as to private consensual conduct sets a hard divide between what is
impermissible to be seen in public versus what is allowed to persist so long
as it remain invisible. Judge Loh’s reasoning in Lim Meng Suang on the
issue of non-enforcement largely depended on the conclusion that Section
377A does not differentiate between public and private, seen and unseen.
The issue of non-enforcement was a major argument lodged by Lim and
Chee when challenging the rational relation of Section 377A to any
legitimate government purpose:187 if the law is not to be enforced, then there
is no reason for the law to exist. Judge Loh, however, argued that actual
enforcement is irrelevant to the primary purpose of Section 377A, which he
concluded was intended to serve as “a moral signpost . . . that reflect[s] the
views of a vast majority of society who were not ready to accept
homosexuality as part of our mainstream way of life.”188 To this end, nonenforcement does not frustrate the purpose of Section 377A if the purpose is
to function as the symbolic disapproval of homosexuality in Singaporean
society.189 Thus, for Judge Loh, it did not matter whether Lim and Chee
would actually have been arrested, or even detected, as the original purpose
of Section 377A was to prevent homosexual behavior even if it was private
and consensual.
In fact, Judge Loh found that one of the primary purposes for adopting
an anti-sodomy statute in 1938 was specifically to extend the law to
encompass not only public but also private conduct. He asserted: “It was
necessary to strengthen the criminal law and enable it to prosecute males
engaging in such grossly indecent acts even if the acts were committed in
private. This was because the then prevailing law made it difficult to detect
and prosecute such acts.” 190 Judge Loh’s finding contains tacit
acknowledgment that prosecution of public acts drives homosexual behavior
187

Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at para. 101.
Id. at para. 84.
189
Id. at para. 134 (“Whether s 377A can still fulfill its purpose of signaling the public’s
disapprobation of male homosexual conduct notwithstanding the policy of non-enforcement is a
consideration for Parliament and is also supported by the presumption of constitutionality. The Plaintiffs
have only provided mere postulations, but no material evidence, to show that the purpose of s 377A would
not be achieved if the provision is not actively enforced.”).
190
Id. at para. 67.
188
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underground, 191 into private and closeted spaces, so that it is less
detectable.192
Professor Eve Sedgwick defines such closeting as both a product and
a manifestation of state oppression, where state endorsement of public
discrimination against gays further confines them into unseen, private
areas. 193 At one level, the unofficial nonenforcement of Section 377A
means that individuals like Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee, who conduct their
identities in the confines of private domestic spaces, are allowed to practice
their gay identities, while individuals like Tan Eng Hong are not. In this
light, the agreement to not prosecute private actions under Section 377A
could be understood as a condemnation of only public obscenity. Professor
Michael Hor argues how, if prosecution of publicly indecent acts is the
purpose, then Section 377A is superfluous since there are other criminal
laws that exist to prosecute those types of behavior.194 The whole reason
why Tan Eng Hong’s challenge initially required a decision on standing was
because the prosecution had dropped the Section 377A charge in favor of a
public obscenity charge.195 However, the decisions of the Court of Appeal
and Judge Loh, which seem to disregard the public and private distinction,
suggest that Section 377A concerns more than just keeping homosexual acts
outside of public sight and consciousness.
Professor Joan Howarth argues that anti-sodomy statutes, even when
unenforced, create “false closets” for many gay individuals, forcing upon
them the choice to publicly identify as citizens or criminals in respect to
their sexual identity. 196 Howarth’s analysis suggests that the quest for
legitimacy, when pursued in certain ways, becomes a closet that inevitably
proves illusory and false. The equal protection argument provides a veneer
of legitimacy to allow certain gay individuals, such as Gary Lim and
Kenneth Chee who claim similarity to conforming heterosexuals, to hide
among those heterosexuals. Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee would not be
prosecuted under Section 377A, not just because they are hidden away from
191

See Yap, supra note 141, at 635.
Jean Shin, The Asian American Closet, 11 ASIAN L.J. 1, 1 (2004) (“The gay closet…is a term used
to describe the process by which some gays may hide their sexuality from public view, in order to avoid
social disapproval or legal sanctions.”).
193
See EVE SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 71 (1990).
194
Michael Hor, Enforcement of 377A: Entering the Twilight Zone, in QUEER SINGAPORE: ILLIBERAL
CITIZENSHIP AND MEDIATED CULTURES 45, 57 (Audrey Yue and Jun Zubillaga-Pow eds., 2012).
195
Tan Eng Hong I, S.G.C.A. 45, at para. 1.
196
Joan W. Howarth, Adventures in Heteronormativity: The Straight Line from Liberace to Lawrence,
5 NEV. L.J. 260, 268 (2004) (“Lawrence thus stands as a monument to the power of even unenforced law.
By repudiating Bowers, Lawrence…vindicated Liberace’s choice to use the law to construct a false closet.
Liberace insisted on being part of the American mainstream. When made to choose, he chose being a
citizen, not a criminal.”).
192
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public view, but because they invisibly conform even in full public view.
Professor Kenji Yoshino characterizes this as the difference between
“passing” and “covering.”197 As advertised by the gay advocacy movement
in Singapore, Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee are a gay couple that is like any
other law-abiding couple in Singapore and therefore deserve equal rights.
Under this view, they deserve equal rights not so much because of their gay
identities, but because of their identity as a normative couple.
Thus, at another level, the nonenforcement of Section 377A against
people like Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee can be understood as a method of
disciplinary state control through self-policing within the gay community.
Nonenforcement constitutes a compromise between the state and certain gay
individuals who agree to conform as citizen subjects and recognize the
legitimacy of the rule of law when applied against nonconforming subjects
such as Tan Eng Hong. The alienation of Tan Eng Hong by gay activists
such as People Like Us and Pink Dot segregates gays who are like
heterosexuals, and therefore deserve protections, from gays who are not, and
therefore do not deserve protections. The “covering” that occurs through the
compromise camouflages gay identity within the veneer of social and moral
acceptability. In his address to Parliament during the debate to repeal
Section 377A, Prime Minister Lee Hsieng Loong alluded generally to spaces
where homosexuality exists and will continue to be tolerated with full public
knowledge.198 Yet obtaining tolerance through this method is, as Howarth
describes, false, since working within the rules legitimizes only the rules, not
the subjects.199
During the 2007 parliamentary debates, petitioners from the Repeal
377A movement described the gay community as model citizens, “often
responsible, invaluable, and highly respected contributing members of
society.”200 Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong responded by acknowledging
their good citizenship, but nevertheless bifurcated their interests from the
family-oriented goals of the mainstream population, calling for compromise
197
Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 772 (2002) (passing, in which the gay individual is
expected to hide her minority sexuality and to impersonate a heterosexual; and covering, in which the
“underlying identity is neither altered nor hidden, but is downplayed.”).
198
Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (22 October 2007) vol 83 at col 2400–01 (Lee
Hsieng Loong, Prime Minister and Minister for Finance) (“De facto, gays have a lot of space in Singapore.
Gay groups hold public discussions. They publish websites. I have visited some of them. There are films
and plays on gay themes . . . There are gay bars and clubs. They exist. We know where they are.
Everybody knows where they are. They do not have to go underground. We do not harass gays. The
Government does not act as moral policemen. And we do not proactively enforce section 377A on them”).
199
Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236,
245 (2006).
200
Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (22 October 2007) vol 83 at col 2399 (Lee
Hsieng Loong, Prime Minister and Minister for Finance).
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between the two poles for the sake social stability and harmony.201 Gary
Lim and Kenneth Chee represent a deeper retreat into the domestic arena for
the purposes of legitimization. Parliament justified the retention of Section
377A by citing the values of Singapore as a family-oriented society set
against deviant gay subjects like Tan Eng Hong.202 Gary Lim and Kenneth
Chee serve as a foil to Tan Eng Hong—they are presented not as deviating
from family values, but rather as exemplifying family values.
The disavowal of Tan Eng Hong and the veneration of Gary Lim and
Kenneth Chee have been central to the incrementalist strategy of gay
advocacy in Singapore. With the polarization of Gary Lim and Kenneth
Chee against Tan Eng Hong as representative models of gay identity,
Singapore is at the same crossroads for gay rights as post-Stonewall politics
of gay liberation in the United States. Originally, the gay rights movement
was much more radical in its response to the criminalization of gay
identity,203 and treated domesticity and marriage with more ambivalence.204
However, as Professor Yuvraj Joshi has observed, “[s]ince the late 1970s,
there has been a paradigm shift within queer politics in which equality
201
Id. at cols. 2399–2400 (Lee Hsieng Loong, Prime Minister and Minister for Finance) (“So, we
should strive to maintain a balance, to uphold a stable society with traditional, heterosexual family values,
but with space for homosexuals to live their lives and contribute to the society.”).
202
Id.at col. 2242 (Li-Ann Thio, Nominated Member of Parliament) (“Acts of gross indecency" under
377A also covers unhygienic practices like "rimming" where the mouth comes into contact with the anus.
Consent to harmful acts is no defence, otherwise, our strong anti-drug laws must fall as it cannot co-exist
with letting in recreational drugs as a matter of personal lifestyle choice. Opposite-sex sodomy is harmful,
but medical studies indicate that same-sex sodomy carries a higher price tag for society because of higher
promiscuity and frequency levels. The New York Times reported that even informed homosexuals return to
unsafe practices like bare-backing and bug-chasing after a health crisis wanes. A British Study showed that
the legalisation of homosexual sodomy correlated with an upsurge of STDs among gays…Public sexual
morality must buttress strong families based on faithful union between man and wife, the best model for
raising children. The state should not promote promiscuity nor condone sexual exploitation.”).
203
Michael Warner, Normal and Normaller: Beyond Gay Marriage, 5 GLQ: J. LESBIAN & GAY STUD.
119, 123 (1999) (For example: “[i]t resisted any attempt to make the norms of straight culture the standards
by which queer life should be measured”; “[i]t especially resisted the notion that the state should be
allowed to grant legitimacy to some kinds of consensual sex but not others or to confer respectability on
some people’s sexuality but not others’”; “[i]t insisted that much of what was taken for morality,
respectability, or decorum was, in practice, a way of regulating sexual relations and pleasures”; “[i]t taught
that self-esteem must not be purchased with a disavowal of sex; it must include esteem for one’s sexual
relations and pleasures, no matter how despised they may commonly be”; “[i]t made itself alert to the
invidiousness of any institution, like marriage, that is designed both to reward those inside it and to
discipline those outside it: adulterers, prostitutes, divorcees, the promiscuous, single people, unwed parents,
those below the age of consent-in short, all who are, for the purposes of marriage law, queer”; “[i]t insisted
that any vision of sexual justice begin by considering the unrecognized dignity of these outcasts, the ways
of living they represent, and the hierarchies of abjection that make them secondary, invisible, or deviant”;
“[i]t became alert to the danger that the same hierarchies would continue to structure the thought of the gay
and lesbian movement itself, whether through ‘internalized homophobia,’ in-group hostility, or simply the
heteronormative perspective unconsciously embedded in so much of our thought and perception.”).
204
See Douglas Nejaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and
its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CAL. L. REV. 87, 94–98 (2014).
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politics have eclipsed liberation politics. Legal recognition of same-sex
relationships has become heralded as the final frontier of queer politics.”205
Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee represent a similar shift in Singaporean gay
activism away from radical politics of individual liberty to a politics of
respectability for the committed couple.206
In the United States, the transformation of gay identity into an issue of
respectability arguably begins with Lawrence v. Texas, the case which Lim
and Chee emulated and referenced with the hope of obtaining similar results.
Several scholars note how in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy domesticated the
defendants John Lawrence and Tyron Garner by framing their sex within an
imagined context of a committed, consensual relationship. 207 However,
there was never any factual corroboration whether Tyron Garner was in a
committed relationship with John Lawrence208 (similar to Gary Lim and
Kenneth Chee) or whether the two were simply engaged in an otherwise
anonymous rendezvous, (similar to Tan Eng Hong and his nameless “coaccused” partner).209 By adopting one interpretation of the facts over the
other, the Lawrence decision painted a scenario where homosexuality is a
publicly acceptable domestic practice, to the tacit exclusion of other forms
of sexual expression that continue to be unimaginable and unspeakable.210
As Joshi explains, “respectable queerness—suggests that the newfound
public recognition of gay people and relationships is contingent upon their
acquiring a respectable social identity that is actually constituted by public
performances of respectability and by privately queer practices.”211 Justice
Kennedy did not pronounce sodomy as absolutely permissible, but rather
205

Yuvraj Joshi, Respectable Queerness, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 415, 416 (2012); see also
Libby Adler, The Gay Agenda, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 147, 148 (2009).
206
See generally JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES (1983); see also Martin Meeker, Behind the Mask of
Respectability: Reconsidering the Mattachine Society and Male Homophile Practice, 1950s and 1960s, 10
J. HIST. SEXUALITY 78 (2001).
207
Franke, supra note 6, at 1408 (“Just as the Court’s earlier Bowers decision and the military’s
‘don’t ask, don't tell’ policy overdetermined gay men and lesbians in sexual terms, we now celebrate a
victory that at its heart underdetermines, if not writes out entirely, their sexuality. Previously, when courts
considered the legal status of gay men, they approached the specter of homosexual sex with a horror
ordinarily reserved for incest cases. Now gay men are portrayed as domesticated creatures, settling down
into marital-like relationships in which they can both cultivate and nurture desires for exclusivity, fidelity,
and longevity in place of other more explicitly erotic desires.”); Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the
New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 387, 398 (2012); Noa Ben Asher, Conferring
Dignity: The Metamorphosis of the Legal Homosexual, 37 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 243, 255 (2014).
208
Murray, supra note 207, at 398.
209
Tan Eng Hong I, S.G.C.A. 45, at para. 4.
210
See Yoshino, supra note 197, at 815 (describing the historical connotations of “sodomy [as] the
‘sin which should neither be named nor committed,’ or the ‘detestable, and abominable sin, amongst
Christians not to be named.’”).
211
Joshi, supra note 205, at 416.
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delineated where and when sodomy was permissible. In the same way, the
competing challenge by Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee immediately following
the ruling in the Tan Eng Hong standing case served as a method of
eclipsing and silencing Tan in favor of a more respectable version of
homosexuality. As a couple who only wanted to legally pursue their “more
enduring bond” with one another, their challenge against Section 377A was
implied to be seeking a more venerated goal than the less deserving Tan, the
single man who presumably desired only anonymous sex.
Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee, as a committed monogamous couple,
look as though they are married, and their equal protection argument
depended largely on this similarity. Tan, on the other hand, could not claim
such a comparison. To this effect, Judge Loh acknowledged the potential
applicability of Hollingsworth v. Perry in Lim Meng Suang,212 but not in Tan
Eng Hong. Marriage is often cast as the archetypical model for legitimate
consensual sex and intimacy.213 In the United States, Lawrence paves the
path to legitimizing gay marriage, 214 or perhaps seen another way,
legitimizing gays through marriage.215 Hollingsworth and Windsor, read in
this light, represent the further entrenching of marriage as the ideal
expression of legitimate sexuality.216 The Windsor decision was, at a certain
level, a validation of the choice of Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer to
conform to the normative standard of marriage—they chose to legitimatize
their relationship, and thus should be allowed the right to enjoy the same
benefits as others who made similar choices.217 In this respect, the Lawrence
decision has indeed become, as Justice Scalia partly anticipated, 218 the
forbearer to a normative strategy for legitimizing gay marriage.
212

Lim Meng Suang I, SGHC 73, at para. 141.
See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 961 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding of fact no. 34,
“Marriage is the state recognition and approval of a couple’s choice to live with each other, to remain
committed to one another and to form a household based on their own feelings about one another and to
join in an economic partnership and support one another and any dependents.”).
214
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 601 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This reasoning leaves on
pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.”).
215
Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1398 (2005) (“[the] moral
heuristic of marriage spawns a novel set of social meanings for lesbian and gay identities. Merely locating
these identities squarely at the center of the moral matrix it configures, which predicates granting lesbians
and gay men full standing within the moral community, gives us, in identity terms, lesbians and gay men as
moral citizen, heterosexuals’ equals.”).
216
See Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 709
(2002); see also Carlos A. Ball, This is Not Your Father’s Autonomy: Lesbian and Gay Rights From a
Feminist and Relational Perspective, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 345 (2005).
217
Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1391 (2005) (“[U]nmarried
couples can properly be treated differently than married couples on a theory of presumed consent--you’re
choosing not to get marriage benefits if you don’t marry.”).
218
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This reasoning leaves on pretty shaky grounds
state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples”); Windsor v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013)
213
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The Biopolitics of Respectable Domesticity

The question remains whether gay marriage is indeed the end of gay
rights.219 However, in the same way that we currently debate whether our
society has become post-racial,220 we will soon likely enter an era where we
will ask if we have also become post-sexuality. In this respect, gay marriage
is perhaps a mirage of formal equality that can mask surviving and invidious
inequalities.221 From a cynical perspective, Hollingsworth and Windsor may
have simply granted invisibility to remaining homophobic prejudices in
society by segregating the gay community into good gays and bad queers.222
Ironically, Windsor could potentially be used to validate discrimination
against “bad queers.” There is an argument that those who do not choose the
same path of formal equality through marriage as Edith Windsor and Thea
Spyer, freely choose to reject that equality and therefore freely choose to be
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“When the Court declared a constitutional right to homosexual sodomy, we were
assured that the case had nothing, nothing at all to do with ‘whether the government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.’ Id., at 578, 123 S. Ct. 2472. Now
we are told that DOMA is invalid because it ‘demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the
Constitution protects,’ ante, at 2694 —with an accompanying citation of Lawrence.”).
219
Russell K. Robinson, Marriage Equality and Postracialism, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1010, 1071 (2014)
(“Andrew Sullivan has been the most vocal and transparent proponent of this view . . . [that] ‘formal public
equality’ as the endgame for the gay rights movement, and rights of access to marriage and the military as
equality's two central planks. Indeed, he argued, ‘If nothing else were done at all, and gay marriage were
legalized, ninety percent of the political work necessary to achieve gay and lesbian equality would have
been achieved. It is ultimately the only reform that truly matters.’ Dan Savage, who emerged as a gay
leader in the wake of Prop. 8, recently declared that the ‘entire gay rights agenda’ entails the right to marry,
bans on discrimination in employment and education, and immigration rights for transnational same-sex
couples. He went on to say that once these laws are in place, ‘the fight over gay rights [will be] essentially
over.””) (quoting ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL 173, 178 (1995)); see also Andrew Sullivan,
The End of Gay Culture: Assimilation and Its Meaning, NEW REPUBLIC, 16 (2005) (identifying assimilation
as the “end of gay culture”); see also DANIEL HARRIS, THE RISE AND FALL OF GAY CULTURE (1997).
220
Sumi Cho, Post-racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1594 (2009) (defining post-racialism as the
“belief that due to the significant racial progress that has been made, the state need not engage in racebased decision-making or adopt race-based remedies, and that civil society should eschew race as a central
organizing principle of social action.”).
221
See Robinson, supra note 219, at 1066 (“To assume that same-sex couples will follow the
trajectory of different-sex couples seems curious and shortsighted. Advocates for LGBT people should
think more critically about the enduring effects of homophobia as well as the structural obstacles that samesex couples are likely to face, including families of origin that are less likely to respect and support a samesex marriage. In limiting their claims to formal equality, marriage equality advocates may foreclose future
avenues of relief.”).
222
Erez Aloni, Incrementalism, Civil Unions, and the Possibility of Predicting Legal Recognition of
Same-Sex Marriage, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 105, 158 (2010) (“[L]egalization of same-sex
marriage may validate those couples who fit in best with straight culture and implicitly penalize those who
are not married, thus privileging to an even greater extent already normative authorizations. Marriage
wages an attack on sexual LGB culture in its failing attempt to create ‘good gays’ and reinforces the
hierarchy of sexual shame by delegitimizing otherwise potentially fulfilling non-monogamous sexual
lives.”).
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discriminated against. In this respect, marriage becomes at once both a
sanctuary and a prison for gays to enjoy apparent equality in society. The
path to that prison starts with Lawrence. Justice Kennedy went to great
lengths to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate sex 223 and
effectively constrained John Lawrence and Tyron Garner within an imagined
normative structure of a committed relationship even though there was no
evidence of such.224 He placed Lawrence and Garner in a false closet, where
their contrived domesticity defined their non-criminality. Justice Kennedy’s
idealized vision of committed gay relationships has become a standard by
which the gay community polices itself. The marriage equality movement is
a push toward normalizing gay sex so that it is like heterosexual sex.225
Those who subscribe to the ideal of marriage enjoy protections, whereas
those who do not are left out.
In his lectures on the evolution of disciplinary power in the modern
state, Michel Foucault defines “biopower,” or the “right to make live and let
die,”226 as a method of modern population control in the liberal democracy.
Having evolved beyond old exercises of power such as war and the physical
killing of aberrant elements of the population,227 the modern state exercises
biopower to affect population dynamics through the granting and denying of
civil rights.228 The state allows certain demographics to thrive through
recognition of their rights, while consigning others to political death through
nonrecognition.229 The right to live, or rather the right to live under certain
223

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not
easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the
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conditions as defined by the state, can only be enjoyed by those who claim
those rights and conditions. As Professor Eduardo Mendieta summarizes,
biopower is the “insidious rationality of having to submit life to the
management of the state, [where] the granting of rights presupposes having
been allowed to live, or to be recognized as living by the political order.”230
In the modern liberal democracy, populations are controlled no longer
through physical force, but through consent and consensus. Professor
Christian Leval describes how Foucault’s theory operates in the liberal
democracy, where “[p]ublic opinion is set up as a permanent tribunal, which
is expected to provide the cheapest and most efficient regulation . . . [and]
[g]overnmentality is the deliberate and careful way in which this chain is set
to work in order to form, guide, correct, and modify behavior.”231 What
results is a self-policing population that is disciplined into building
consensus through conformity and exclusion.232
The incrementalist march towards marriage equality narrows rights,
which Foucault’s designates as “life,” to a discreet group of subjects who
concede to conventional norms of acceptable sexuality. A recent report by
Harvard Law Review on developments in the law on sexual orientation and
gender identity suggests that “[s]ame-sex marriage, it may be said, helps one
particular constituency—middle-aged and middle-class gays and lesbians in
committed partnerships—but it does little to resolve problems that are most
significant to other constituencies under the LGBT umbrella.”233 Gay rights,
when conceived of as climaxing in the equal right to marriage, excludes
those who may not subscribe to marriage and desire to express their
sexuality outside of normative monogamous relationships.234 Those who do
not conform to marriage, once granted as an equal right, are consigned to
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non-recognition,235 which creates political death. For example, following
Windsor, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services began to
grant spousal and fiancée immigration rights to qualifying same-sex
partners.236 However, in order to qualify, the couples are required to marry.
Those who elect not to marry cannot take advantage of those rights. The
granting of equal rights for committed gay relationships started with the
imagined domestication of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner and culminated
with the conferring of marriage equality to Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer.
Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee claim this American model as their inherited
legacy. This communicates to individuals like Tan Eng Hong, who may not
be able to access such spaces due to socioeconomic or other differences,237
that there is no place for their versions of homosexuality.238
Ironically, the “out and proud” sensibility in the early days of gay
rights in the United States was largely a response to the tyranny of the closet
and the exiling of gay expression to more secretive and invisible venues
caused by restrictive laws.239 Many activists regard the Stonewall riots240 as
the turning point for a more public gay rights movement,241 which was
founded as a radical protest against rule of law.242 Several scholars have
criticized how the revolutionary beginnings of gay liberation have given way
235
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to accommodationist strategies243 and submission to the rule of law.244 As
Professor Katherine Franke critiques, a major pitfall of seeking equal
citizenship is acknowledging the self as a citizen-subject.245 In contrast to
Professor Kenji Yoshino, who identifies covering as a type of camouflage
where “underlying identity is neither altered nor hidden, but is
downplayed,”246 Franke suggests that rather than downplay, gay politics upplays a certain type of visibility and public performance that invites
spectatorship. Franke describes “a certain kind of citizen-subject who
becomes politically legible by and through a particular form of intimate
affiliation.”247 “Of course, the citizen-subjects who have signed up for this
form of enfranchisement are called upon to enact a peculiar set of public
performances.”248 Yoshino focuses on passing and covering as reactions to
being judged by others249 in an effort to not be seen. Franke, on the other
hand, suggests that modern gay subjects engage in performances so that they
are seen “not as abject criminals, but as citizen-subjects.”250 Yet the desire
to be seen as respectable validates the norms for respectability.251
The development of the self-policing subject depends on the
interrelation between public spectacle and civic participation, of seeing the
self as a citizen and thus an extension of the state when it stands in judgment
of deviant elements.252 Yoshino briefly notes the juridical nature of passing,
where “[t]o pass” can mean “to judge.”253 The performance of respectable
gayness involves both judging and being judged, both seeing and being seen
as participating citizens of the democratic state. It is through these
normalizing judgments, the consciousness of watching and being watched,
that society determines who are equal citizens and who are not—this forms
the basis of liberal government.254 Foucault develops his theory of biopower
243
See Suzanna Danuta Walters, The Few, the Proud, the Gays: Don’t Ask, Don't Tell and the Trap of
Tolerance, 18 WM & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 87 (2011); see also SUZANNA DANUTA WALTERS, ALL THE
RAGE: THE STORY OF GAY VISIBILITY IN AMERICA 18 (2001); see also Victoria Clarke, Lesbian and Gay
Marriage: Transformation or Normalization?, 13 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 519 (2003); see also Warner,
supra note 203.
244
See generally Franke, supra note 199.
245
Id. at 246; see also Diane Richardson, Locating Sexualities: From Here to Normality, 7
SEXUALITIES 391 (2004).
246
Yoshino, supra note 197, at 772.
247
Franke, supra note 199, at 239.
248
Franke, supra note 199, at 239.
249
Yoshino, supra note 197, at 813.
250
Franke, supra note 199, at 246.
251
See Joshi, supra note 205, at 467.
252
See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 52, at 32–69.
253
Yoshino, supra note 197, at 813.
254
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS 67 (Graham Burchell trans., 2008) (“The
Panopticon is the very formula of liberal government.”).

JANUARY 2015

GAY LIBERATION IN THE ILLIBERAL STATE

43

largely in response to the failed revolutionary movements of the 1960s that
eventually led to the rise of liberal democracy, and his criticism suggests that
liberal government is a veiled form of totalitarianism.255 The shift in gay
rights towards a strategy of incrementalism and assimilation aligns gay
interests with the interests of the state,256 and demonstrates governmentality.
Ironically, although Lawrence seemed to declare that the morality of
the majority was not a valid state interest,257 and Lim and Chee similarly
challenged public morals as the reasonable rationale for Section 377A,258 the
domesticated versions of gay existence that they presented actually
legitimize the morality of the majority in other ways. Family values are
routinely cited as reasons justifying the differential treatment of gays. The
push for marriage equality embraces rather than challenges the validity of
granting special privileges to families. Lawrence, Windsor, Hollingsworth,
and Lim and Chee’s case all envision and constrain gay sexuality within the
structure of normative family values. In the same way that Pink Dot does
not challenge the restriction the Singaporean government places on public
assembly and expression through speech, but instead acquiesces to the
narrow restrictions imposed by the state, mainstream gay advocates in both
Singapore and the United States have limited gay expression to the state’s
definition. The monogamous family unit becomes the narrow space for
acceptable public expression of gay sexuality, just like a small corner in
Hong Lim Park where gays are allowed to congregate publicly once per year.
In the same way that Tan Eng Hong was hidden from view in the 2013 Pink
Dot, the rights of “bad queers” like him been effaced and forgotten in the
discourse of marriage equality.
V.

CONCLUSION

Professor Jothie Rajah describes illiberalism “as the Other of
liberalism . . . understood in terms of the absences, fractures and subversions
of political liberalism.”259 Indeed, the apparent freedoms enjoyed by citizens
in liberal democracies have often been used to criticize more restrictive
conditions in many developing nations, particularly “Orientalized” countries
255
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in Asia and the Middle East.260 Yet the comparison of recent gay rights
cases in the United States and Singapore suggests that the liberalism and
illiberalism may be equivalent if not also linked.261 At first blush, it may
appear that the Singaporean gay rights movement, represented by Pink Dot
and the Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee lawsuit, follows a Westernized strategy
that has been successful in the United States and Europe.262 However, the
strategy adopted in Singapore may not be a pure emulation of liberalism but
a response to illiberalism. As discussed earlier, illiberal pragmatism
manifests in the unsystematic enforcement of Section 377A, which creates a
culture of fear and caution for gay activism in Singapore. Sensitivity to the
totalitarian style of government has led to a strategy of incrementalism and
accomodation to the rule of law, where gays cautiously set their own
boundaries as to the proper time, place, and manner for gay life such as Pink
Dot. Rather than think of Singaporean gay activism as modeling a Western
style of advocacy, it may be useful to consider the possibility that the gay
rights movement in Singapore, though similar, evolved independently from
gay movements in Western countries. The fact that both systems of
government bred gay movements that resulted in incrementalist approaches
suggests that the two systems are not so different. Thus, a comparative
analysis of the gay movements in Singapore and the United States exposes
the illiberal aspects of American democracy. Under both systems, legal
sexual expression is limited to heteronormative ideals of “more enduring”
bonds of monogamy and marriage. The legacy of Lawrence and marriage
equality, in this light, is simply the American version of Pink Dot. Gays are
allowed freedoms of sexual expression insofar as they follow the rules.
Moreover, by validating marriage as an institution, the push for marriage
equality also maintains and shields continuing hierarchies and inequalities
inherent in the institutions.263
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Rather, there is some usefulness to recognizing differences among
gays, and that marriage and monogamy are not solutions for all. Judge
Loh’s application of the intelligible differentia test to finally validate Section
377A in Lim Meng Suang illustrates some fundamental problems with
seeking only structural equal treatment as heterosexuals. Despite attempts to
hide among heterosexuals, gays are still perceived as fundamentally
different. Judge Loh’s explanation of rational review in the Lim and Chee
decision, that “equality before the law and equal protection of the law under
Art 12(1) does not mean that all persons are to be treated equally, but that all
persons in like situations are to be treated alike,”264 foreshadows his eventual
conclusion that Singaporean society intentionally differentiates gays from
heterosexuals. Even if Section 377A had been ruled a violation of equal
protection, structural equality does not address the underlying attitudes at
play that are responsible for the laws in the first place. Successful
constitutional challenges to anti-sodomy statutes in other jurisdictions have
often come hand in hand with attitudinal changes in society regarding
homosexuality, which is the chief assumption behind incrementalism. As
both Judge Loh and Parliament have made clear, however, Singaporean
society has not arrived at this point, and progress will likely be slow given
the illiberal pragmatics of the government. Although Pink Dot has been
exponentially growing, public opinion on homosexuality in Singapore has
remained overwhelmingly negative with 78% of the population believing
that homosexual relations are “always wrong/almost always wrong,” and
only 11% believing they are “not wrong most of the time/not wrong at
all.”265 In spite of attempts by gay couples like Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee
to differentiate themselves from the stereotypes of criminality and deviance
that Tan Eng Hong represents, society still views them no differently. The
decision by the Singaporean Court of Appeal to consolidate the two cases
reflects this sentiment, yet its decision also allows for something more
radical to occur.
The Singapore Court of Appeal ultimately upheld the anti-sodomy
statute, but one thing has become clear: if gays continue to be formally
discriminated against, they will be discriminated against together. The
Court of Appeal refused to entertain Lim and Chee’s attempt to characterize
their relationship as outside the moral scope of objectionable behavior such
as male prostitution.266 Their relationship, although private and consensual,
is to be treated equally as those of male prostitutes and people like Tan Eng
264
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Hong. In other words, in the eyes of the Singapore government, good gays
and bad queers are the same. This forces solidarity upon the gay
community, which can then potentially create an alternative path to
empowerment, and mark a return to the roots of gay liberation that appears
to have been sidetracked as a matter of legal strategy in the United States.
The current state of gay advocacy in Singapore offers a visualization of the
road not travelled in Lawrence and the potential to imagine gay identity
itself rather than legitimate expressions of gay identity as a recognized right,
as well as a warning of the pitfalls of Lawrence and Windsor.
The Singaporean gay community currently adopts an incrementalist
strategy for advocacy that accommodates the illiberal democracy in which it
exists.267 The community has sought to create spaces for expression of gay
identity within the rules on multiple fronts, organizing Pink Dot according to
the time, place, and manner permitted by the government.268 Its model test
case argues for equal treatment of gays with heterosexuals, per Lawrence
and Windsor. Yet, these American gay rights cases ultimately establish
normative standards for proper sexual expression that produce self-policing
gay subjects who are similarly compliant as subjects in an illiberal state.
Tan Eng Hong, on the other hand, presents the perhaps radical argument that
the behavior of some gay couples should not be differentiated from those
that are deviant and criminal, and should not be venerated as models more
suitable for publicly presentation. Acknowledging the intelligible differentia
between gays and heterosexuals, but not the intelligible differentia between
committed gay couples, like Gary Lim and Kenneth Chee, and single men
looking for singular sexual encounters, raises the question whether any of
that behavior should be criminal, which may form the basis of a better model
for gay liberation.
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